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Abstract∗ 
There exists a possibility that the management of Norway’s the Government Pension Fund 
Global (“the Oil Fund”) is not doing its job well due to the fund’s large size and a number of 
other challenges. The fund’s historic data were tested for opportunistic conduct and 
examined for the diligence of execution of the strategy assigned by the fund’s investment 
mandate. Firstly, the performance results disclosed for 2001-2012 were tested for 
excessively high returns around reporting dates. Then, the data were tested for probability of 
buying stocks due to stocks’ earlier performance, characteristics of size, investment style, 
sector, economy of origin, and previous decision to buy. The dynamics of odds for buying 
and selling stocks were also compared over time. No evidence for the fund’s management 
window-dressing the results of their performance or deviating from the investment mandate 
was found. 
∗ The author is grateful to Trond Døskeland, Liam Brunt, Jørgen Haug, Aksel Mjøs, Thorsten Hens, Klaus 
Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, and Mikalai Mikhnikau for useful discussions, and to Dmytro Fisinchuk, Ivan Belik, 
Bård Fyhn, Ruben Østrem, and Salt Bergen for invaluable support during the work on the research. 
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1. Introduction 
The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) has been spectacular for the last two decades. This 
has attracted much of attention from public, academia and media for the recent years. The 
funds are there to secure well-being of entire nations and they have become serious players 
on the international markets arena.  
However, managing an SWF is an enormously challenging mission. Not only the 
management is responsible for financial future of a country, being a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the funds also pose a challenge for the managers who mostly come from 
commercial investment funds industry due to their dissimilarities with the commercial 
counterparts. The managers implement approaches that they got used to during their years in 
a mutual or hedge fund, although, hardly all of the methods from the industry are truly 
appropriate for an SWF. Each SWF is also an exceptionally individual phenomenon.  
The Government Pension Fund Global of Norway (the Fund) is currently the largest investor 
in the world owned by one nation. Norway’s wealth generated by surpluses from oil-based 
revenues is transferred to an SWF that invests worldwide. The Fund is notable for its 
independence from the country’s ministry of finance and is run by Norges Bank that has 
created a separate similar to a commercial fund entity for managing the Fund. The Fund’s 
management has so far demonstrated performance which is acceptable along the guidelines 
prescribed by the nation’s parliament.  
But has the Fund’s management been really prudent in their work? Given its remarkable 
importance for the country’s leaders and the entire nation of Norway, the question is central 
to this research.  
In order to formulate a meaningful answer, the matter is approached from two directions.  
Firstly, the managers’ prudence is queried for opportunistic conduct. If managers act 
irresponsibly with a motive of benefitting from such actions, i.e. act opportunistically, they 
clearly do not do their job well. To examine the management actions, historic data of the 
Fund’s positions in equity securities are tested for presence of signs of window dressing of 
the performance results reported by the management. Given the managers get compensated 
for demonstrating superior performance, apparently, such devious actions can potentially 
occur.  
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Next, the diligence of execution of the Fund’s strategy along the prescribed investment 
mandate is reviewed. The intuition here is somewhat different from that of the previous 
approach which implies acquisition of some personal gain that motivates a manager to act 
dishonestly. Apart from being misleading on purpose, a manager can simply not cope with 
the duties as the result of incompetence or even negligence. In order to address the central 
problem of the quality of the Fund’s management work from this perspective, the decisions 
to buy and sell stocks – actions that can directly be attributed to the fund’s managers – are 
empirically reviewed along the guidelines set forward by the fund’s objectives. 
Apart from Introduction, the research consists of the following parts. First part provides an 
overview of SWFs along their essentials and compares the funds to their commercial 
counterparts. Second part reviews the Fund’s organization, characteristics as an SWF, and its 
recent performance.  
Third part establishes theoretical background for further analyses along the discussion of 
relevant theories. The discussion starts with an outline of major finance theories that describe 
the financial markets environment and explain formation of abnormal returns for a fund. The 
theoretical review continues with a revision of fund management theory and, eventually, a 
summary of evidence from academic literature that imprudent management conduct poses a 
realistic threat for SWFs.  
Fourth part is dedicated to empirical examination of the Fund’s management work along the 
two perspectives outlined previously. Firstly, a hypothesis for significant difference of 
abnormal returns around the Fund’s reporting date weeks and, then, a hypothesis for 
systematic abnormal returns patterns for other weeks are tested. After that, six tests for 
relation between the Fund’s management decisions to buy and sell stocks and a number of 
other explanatory factors are performed and reviewed along the Fund’s investment mandate. 
The results of entire research are summarized and appropriate conclusions are made in 
Conclusions. Data and methodology are covered in details along the text, and theories 
outlined in earlier sections are implemented in latter empirical part. In addition to English 
language sources, materials that have Norwegian as their original language are used. 
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2. Overview of sovereign wealth funds  
The mere fundamentals of state power are based, primarily, on institutional securitization of 
essential needs of a society. In The Republic, written by Plato back in the 4th century BC, 
Socrates in book VI points out that the virtue for philosophers is to create harmonious 
cooperation within the ideal city. And, according to book IV, the city’s guardians are there to 
securitize this environment where each citizen engages in the occupation that suits this 
person best to make sure everyone is merry.  
Taking this intuition of the ancient thinker to the modern day realities, the government’s 
primary task is to take certain actions in order to make its citizens feel safe, so that they 
could contribute to everyone’s benefit with the fruit of their work. The feeling of safety is 
also the second-order base level of the infamous Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 
preceded only by physiological needs like breathing. Although, an average grown up 
individual, under normal conditions, has a fairly relatively strong control over her present, 
she is hardly in charge of her feeling of insecurity regarding her future. Combining the idea 
of the government’s responsibility to gratify its people confidence in the everyday life 
activities and the source of timidity due to the future’s uncertainty, a state-controlled pension 
system seems to be a rather natural social phenomenon. 
A pension fund is any plan, fund, or scheme which provides retirement income. This is a 
simple but rather well-specified definition provided by Wikipedia, a universal source of 
information that fashions a widely accepted understanding of the concept by the global 
public today. And, although, there exists a large number of various private financial products 
created with the aim to address the client’s need to feel safe about her future, it is the 
ultimate responsibility of the government of a given country to guarantee this safety by the 
available means, like legislation, control, and law enforcement. Eventually, a state-owned 
and controlled pension fund should offer supreme insurance for the retirement income, given 
the government officials’ incentives are in the right place and the expertise of those in charge 
is, at least, not inferior to that of the commercial managers.  
From the entire selection of the state-owned pension solutions, perhaps, none has had more 
attention than the recent rise of the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The total value for the 
assets under control of SWFs, as of April 2014, is estimated by SWF Institute to be over 
$6.3 trillion. Moreover, for the period of only twelve years, starting from 2000, governments 
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around the globe acquired around $969 billion worth of stocks, whereas, sold only $765 
billion through direct sales or privatization (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, & Megginson, 2012). 
Additionally, the tendency in growth of SWFs is significantly higher than that of other types 
of investment funds. The total SWFs assets under management have been growing at the 
pace of 24% per year and have increased ten times for the period of only three years, from 
2009 to 2012 (Bernstein, Lerner, & Schoar, 2013).  
A sole definition of an SWF is also not entirely agreed upon. International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) defines SWFs as special investment funds created or owned by government to hold 
foreign assets for long term purposes (2007). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) has a more specified explanation for what it sees an SWF to be, 
“SWFs are pools of assets owned and managed directly or indirectly by governments to 
achieve national objectives” (2008). McKinsey Global Institute (2008) regards an SWF as a 
fund that has diversified portfolios that range across equity, fixed income, real estate, bank 
deposits, and alternative investments, such as hedge funds and private equity. Truman’s 
vision for an SWF (Truman, 2007) is that it is a collection of government-owned or 
government-controlled assets, from a broad perspective. His narrower definitions may, 
however, exclude government financial or nonfinancial corporations, purely domestic assets, 
foreign exchange reserves, assets owned or controlled by subnational governmental units, or 
some or all government pension funds. Finally, Balding (2008) states that an SWF is a pool 
of capital controlled by a government, or government related entity, that invests in assets 
seeking returns above the risk-free rate of return.  
Perhaps, a decent summary for the SWF definition would be “a financial entity owned by a 
government for receiving economic benefits from investing in various assets”. 
2.1 Sovereign wealth funds essentials 
2.1.1 Objectives 
OECD believes that there is a number of potential objectives of SWFs which are not always 
easy to attribute to a particular fund, and some funds may have more than one of the 
distinguishable objectives. Some of these are to diversify assets, to get a better return on 
reserves, to provide for pensions in the future, to provide for future generations when natural 
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resources run out, to stabilize prices, to promote industrialization, and to promote strategic 
and political objectives.  
The first four of the listed objectives, due to being better specified, can be summarized in 
two broader categories.  
First, governments run SWFs with the purpose of earning return on its monetary holdings 
such as foreign exchange deposits or fiscal surpluses. The return on an SWF that such a 
government seeks should be higher than the return it could receive from low-risk investing in 
money market with, for example, a large international bank. In other words, as Balding 
points out, the capital pooled in an SWF should yield a return which is higher than the 
current risk-free rate.  
Second, SWFs are regarded as means for diversification of a country’s economy. The SWFs 
capital can be invested either in local, regional economy or can be used for hedging 
purposes, like that of diversifying away from commodity-dependent domestic economy 
(Truman, 2007). However, it should be noted that the decision to invest in a local or 
structurally different economy can also be driven by reasons like better expertise or a feel of 
comfort due to familiarity with a regional economy, or just simply other than long-term 
investment needs. 
2.1.2 Capital 
According to OECD, SWFs may be funded by foreign exchange reserves, sales of scarce 
resources such as oil, or from taxes and other revenues.  
Most SWFs derive their capital from government revenues due to commodities sales. 
Norway is a classic example of the case when royalties collected in form of special taxes 
from oil and gas sales are transferred into an SWF. Other countries, like Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and UAE have similar policies.  
However, as mentioned, although commodity driven economies are first line candidates for 
establishing an SWF, natural resources are not the only source for the SWFs capital. The 
examples of countries that established non-commodity based SWFs include China and 
Singapore who built their SWFs on the basis of continuous fiscal surpluses and accumulation 
of foreign reserves. Most of other European SWFs, like that of Italy or France, are also non-
commodity based.   
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Having discussed the sources for the input capital for an SWF, the rules for withdrawal of 
capital from a fund can hardly be easily summarized.  
Perhaps, the best way to demonstrate how different country governments are in their 
approach to setting the policies for capital withdrawals the examples of Norway and Russia 
should be outlined. Norway has a simple stringent policy of using for fiscal purposes for the 
period of one fiscal year no more than 4% of its SWF’s capital invested outside of Norway, 
known as “handlingsregelen” (Finansdepartement, 2000-2001). Russia, on the other end of 
the systematic stringency paradigm, established its Stabilization Fund in the end of the 1990s 
with the oil prices around $30 per barrel with strict limits, but, after the price sky rocketed to 
$100, implemented rather loose adjustments to capital withdrawal policies (Balding, 2012).      
2.1.3 Transparency and international cooperation 
Each SWF also has rather individual profile of transparency. This is often attributed to the 
fact that SWFs are regulated by their home government. Being the primary (and the only) 
owner of the fund in charge of its own regulation, it comes naturally that each domestic 
government is prone to be quite liberal in its approaches to defining a governing legal base 
for a fund it owns.  The degree of transparency, in this situation, could be regarded as solely 
a voluntary decision, rather than a necessity. Keeping in mind that poor performance of an 
SWF can become a widely used evidence for the incompetence of the ruling government, 
transparency is something the reigning cabinet could be reluctant to augment.  
To compare funds on the basis of transparency, SWF Institute in 2008 developed their own 
transparency measure, referred by them as the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. The 
index has ten major principles along which an SWF accumulates total points, one point for 
each principle. Perhaps, the most important principles that should be outlined are provision 
of up-to-date independently audited annual reports, percentage of company holdings and 
their geographical locations, total portfolio market value, returns, and management 
compensation (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2008). 
An important milestone in setting internationally recognized rules for the SWFs gameplay 
was the achievement of consensus on the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, or so-
called Santiago Principles, in October 2008. The principles were developed by International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and were backed by World Bank and 
OECD. An IWG statement said the purpose of the Santiago Principles was to establish a 
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transparent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate operational controls, 
risk management and accountability, ensure compliance with applicable regulatory and 
disclosure requirements in the countries in which SWFs invest, ensure SWFs invest on the 
basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations, and help maintain a 
stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment (International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2008). There are 24 items listed as the Santiago 
Principles, among which are the principles that are there with the purpose of coordination of 
situations where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic 
implications (those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and 
monetary authorities so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies), 
and clear definition of responsibility and accountability for the individuals in charge of the 
SWF’s management. 
2.2 Sovereign wealth funds distinctions from commercial 
funds 
Little consensus in today’s world about a universally acknowledged one effective model for 
an SWF exists today. Works of Scherer (2009), Chhaocharia and Laeven (2009), Fernandes 
(2011), Dyck and Morse (2011), Bodie and Briére (2011), Johan, Knill, and Mauck (2013), 
and Avendaño and Santiso (2011) are all dedicated to discussion on SWFs designs and 
portfolio structures. Bortolotti et al. (2013) argue that given the purely financial investment 
objectives of the SWFs, they are most comparable to privately held institutional investors 
like mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional endowments. And, although, an SWF is a 
fund with a similar purpose of making money for investors, the major traits of such a fund 
are crucially different from that of the commercial counterparts. 
2.2.1 Size 
SWFs, as mentioned previously, have considerably outgrown commercial funds in the last 
fifteen or so years. The size of SWFs makes them significant macroeconomic players on the 
global arena. The rules of the game set up by regulators in various countries that are there to 
address fairness and market integrity can, given the size of SWFs, actually, backfire.  
The ongoing discussion of the Regulation National Market System which introduced the 
Trade Through Rule whereby market orders must be matched at the National Best Bid and 
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Offer (NBBO) system, is a good example of such a situation. With the NBBO at place, 
SWFs, being large buyers/sellers, have undesired market exposure to the volumes of asset 
blocks they are about to buy or unload after an order is placed with a broker. By simple rules 
of supply and demand, given substantial size of orders even taking into account that the 
entire order is broken into smaller blocks, this can have an impact on the market price for the 
asset. The NBBO, in this case, creates market information asymmetry, as those who have 
access to the system, like licensed brokers, can exploit this for their own benefit. And 
although front-running is recognized to be an illegal practice by many regulators worldwide, 
given technological advances of so called “high frequency trades”, front running can actually 
take place without particular individuals being taken accountable. An extensive discussion of 
the effect of high frequency trading and NBBO is presented in NBIM’s Discussion Note 1 
(Norges Bank, 2013).   
2.2.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity constraints of SWFs are also considerably different from that of commercial funds. 
Having sources of capital controlled by country governments, which have authoritative 
power over the country’s economic agents, like households and businesses, SWFs are 
regarded to have much deeper pockets than that of commercial funds. And, although, 
practically, all market participants are exposed to market instabilities and crashes, having 
liquidity coming from, say, tax-payers, SWFs have a much more superior position when it 
comes to going back in game after a substantial market dip.  
Additionally, not having a need to keep a fraction of SWF capital as cash reserves for clients 
who are about to claim their capital after a lock-up period (given, such a lock-up period 
exists; otherwise, cash reserves should be kept by a commercial fund at all time), SWFs are 
better off when it comes to harvesting liquidity premiums. Furthermore, the investment 
horizon of SWFs is usually longer than that of the commercial funds. A simple reason for 
this is that commercial funds serving private clients can hardly have an investment horizon 
longer than a life-time of an individual. This also has a substantial positive effect on the 
liquidity standing for an SWF relatively to other market participants. 
2.2.3 Risk profile 
Risk profile of SFWs is also different from most of commercial funds. Given responsible 
and, at a time, rather ambitious objectives set forward by political leaders of a country for a 
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state owned fund, an SWF can hardly get involved in overly risky strategies. Low risk 
profiles for SWFs also make sense if approaching to creation of an SWF as a better 
alternative to investing in assets that yield the risk-free rate (Balding, 2008). Moreover, an 
evidently bold gambling strategy, if traced back to an SWF, can have a negative impact on 
political standing of a country’s government, as it can be interpreted as irresponsible attitude 
to the country’s future. 
2.2.4 Performance  
Procedures used for performance evaluation of an SWF are also different from those of 
commercial funds. Initially, it is a country’s legislative body that drafts and adopts the 
framework along which the effectiveness of a fund should be measured.  
A common practice of adopting an index that should be used to account for the performance 
of the fund in relation to the appropriate market and/or strategy is also rather challenging. 
Given the wide variety of commercial funds that compete for clients, most of the 
benchmarks for commercial funds are readily available from specialized financial 
information vendors, like MSCI or Standard and Poor’s. Since SWFs have rather unique 
objectives and investment mandates defined by local governments, it is quite challenging to 
specify a suitable readily available to the public benchmark against which a fund’s 
performance should be compared.  
Moreover, considerable heterogeneity of SWFs makes it quite challenging, if not at all 
impossible, to compare performance of one SWF to that of another. Furthermore, differences 
in structures of SWFs and their dissimilarity to the structures of commercial funds prescribe 
personally tailored practices for performance evaluation of each individual fund. 
2.2.5 Organization 
Organizational structures of SWFs are also different from that of the commercial funds and 
vary significantly from country to country. As Truman (2008) points out in his discussion for 
the SWFs structures, the structures seem to be rather flexible and many of the funds had their 
initial designs altered over the years of their existence or shut down completely due to 
rigidity with a subsequent start of a new entity taking the objectives of the earlier SWF.  
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Another important aspect about the organizational built of SWFs is the distance that a fund 
keeps between itself and the governmental body in charge of the country’s fiscal and 
monetary policy, like a ministry of finance. Some funds, like that of Russia’s Stabilization 
Fund, are directly controlled by the country’s ministry of finance, whereas, management of 
other SWFs, like that of the Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, is entirely 
outsourced to another organizational unit, which is still subordinated to the ministry of 
finance, but whose actions in managing the fund are not directly controlled. It’s hard to 
specify which distance is more efficient, as the in-house endorsement of a fund ensures 
better cooperation for the country’s internal fiscal policy fit, and the independency of a 
fund’s management gives more room for maneuvering in the fast changing global financial 
markets. 
2.2.6 Costs 
The previous discussions of the SWFs organizational structures and evaluation of 
performance, logically, take us to the next substantial difference of SWFs from commercial 
funds, the funds costs structures.  
The standard hedge funds management agreement is comprised of a 2% fixed fee with a 
20% incentive fee and a high water mark. The manager thus receives 2% fixed fee of net 
assets per year and 20% of gains in excess of a fixed percentage benchmark or a flexible 
market rate, like LIBOR. The high water mark provision was designed to incentivize 
management to recoup the earlier losses before the 20% premium on gains is paid.  
Mutual funds costs can be broken into two broader categories. The first category is the 
current expenses such as administrative costs, management expertise fees, and sometimes 
even promotion fees (12B-1 fee in the United States, for example).  
The costs are usually measured with the help of management expense ratio which is 
determined through an annual calculation, where a fund's operating expenses are divided by 
the average dollar value of its assets under management. The second costs category is what a 
client pays when she buys or sells a mutual fund. These costs are often referred to as “loads”. 
Fund costs substantially lower the net return which a client receives. This is not a surprise, as 
the commercial funds are out there with the primary objective to make money for their 
founders.  
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SWFs, however, are owned by governments and, to large extent, have a vision to serve for 
their country’s public benefit. The expertise that SWFs use for managing their capital, 
naturally, does not come for free. And, although, managers might be paid rather generously, 
they don’t have transgression over their compensation, as it is the country’s government that 
decides on their fees.  
Having such inconsistency in management fees between the commercial funds and SWFs 
might make one wonder if this is all fair. To shed some light on this seemingly bigoted 
situation, it can be argued that, with the SWFs, a typical investor who is a citizen of the fund 
owning country, does not have power to somehow directly express her disagreement with 
management fees (or any other policy) by simply choosing not to invest in the country’s 
SWF, something she can do with a commercial fund. 
2.2.7 Social effects 
Eventually, the social effects of SWFs are fundamentally different from those of commercial 
funds. Firstly, the objectives set forward by the SWF founding governments are aimed at 
home country citizens’ future or present public benefit, whereas, commercial funds are, 
primarily, out there to promote the welfare of their founders. Secondly, SWFs have strong 
political liabilities, as there’s always a clearly defined government of a particular country 
that stands behind an SWF. These ties can be used for political reasons, be that on the 
international or domestic arenas.  
Moreover, given the large size of many SWFs, becoming a major shareholder of a firm that 
operates in a foreign defense sector can trigger extensive political speculations. To address 
these issues, many SWFs have voluntarily adopted the Santiago Principles discussed earlier. 
In addition to them, some countries developed guidelines, to which many refer as 
“responsible investing”, on their own. 
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3. Sovereign wealth fund of Norway (The 
Government Pension Fund Global) 
An SWF, often quoted as a responsible investor, Norway’s the Government Pension Fund 
Global (throughout the rest of the text referred to as the Fund) is the largest SWF with the 
total asset holdings estimated at the level of $838 billion1.  
The Fund was founded in 1990 by the Parliament (Stortinget) as a part of the State Pension 
Fund (Statens Pensjonsfond). State Pension Fund, whose primary objectives are, according 
to Law on State Pension Fund (Lov om Statens pensjonsfond), to save funds for financing of 
social security payments and accumulation of long-term wealth from the state’s oil-related 
activities intakes, consists of two funds: the Fund (Statens pensjonsfond utland) and the 
Government Pension Fund Norway (Statens pensjonsfond Norge).  
The Fund is formed from the budget transfers of state revenues received from “oil 
cooperation” net transaction costs. The state revenues from “oil cooperation” include various 
taxes levied on companies that perform exploration and extract oil on the Norway’s 
continental and sea territories. The revenues also include indirect taxation of the oil-related 
activities, such as taxes on CO2 and NOx from oil-related activities, dividends from Statoil 
ASA and proceedings from the state’s sales of share stakes in the company, and other 
revenues from state engagement in oil-related activities. The funds are transferred to an 
account with Norges Bank who is responsible for further management of the capital 
(Stortinget, 1990, ed.2005).  
3.1 Framework for the Fund’s organization and 
management 
Further actions of Norges Bank (“the Bank”) regarding the Fund management are governed 
by Mandate on the Fund Management (Stortinget, 2010), referred to as “the Mandate” 
throughout the rest of the text. The Bank is granted independency from the Department of 
Finance in management, in its own name, of the funds received on the Fund account with the 
objective to deliver as high return on the capital as possible.  
1 As of April 2014 (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014). 
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The Bank is required to develop Strategic plan along the Mandate’s guidelines. The 
Mandate, also, obliges the Bank to act as a responsible investor and cooperate with 
organizations like OECD and the UN’s Global Compact when investing in multinational 
corporations. In addition to this, the Bank should use the internally developed guidelines for 
responsible investing, and should actively participate in the international cooperation aimed 
at research in this field.  
A noteworthy feature of regulation aimed at responsible investing is the prescription to 
invest in environment-related assets with the total market value of the capital allocated for 
these assets equal to from 20 to 30 billion Norwegian krona (NOK). A generous gesture with 
hardly a concrete specification for what assets are defined as environmental, and what 
exactly is regarded as value added to solution of global environmental problems. 
General investment policy 
The Bank is prescribed to invest in three classes of assets. The first class is equities that 
should constitute 60% of the entire portfolio value, adjusted for the real estate. The Bank is 
required to invest in stocks of companies listed on recognized and well regulated exchanges. 
In addition to investing in shares of such firms, the Bank is allowed to invest in equivalents 
of listed shares and depository receipts for this type of equity securities, and the equity 
securities of companies that seek listing.  
The other classes of assets are fixed income securities with low risk profiles (should 
comprise 40% of non-real estate portfolio) such as bonds, and real estate. There is an 
exception for investing in basic infrastructure related real estate like railways, roads or 
airports, in addition to more detailed guidelines.  
The Bank is not permitted to invest in derivative financial instruments, unless they are 
directly related to investing in the three main asset classes. The value of the Fund’s assets is 
calculated in Norwegian krona by the end of each month net of the costs encountered by the 
Bank and adjusted for the actual currency conversion rate. The actual weights for allocations 
in the main asset classes are compared to those defined previously on the last trading day of 
a month. If the actual weight of equity securities on this day differs by over 4%, the Bank is 
required to rebalance by the final trade day of the next month. The Bank is also not permitted 
to invest in Norway. 
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Reference benchmarks 
Equity securities 
The reference index for the equity class securities is FTSE Global All Cap Index (GACI). It 
is a market-capitalization weighted index representing performance of large, mid and small-
cap stocks globally. The index is an aggregate of around 7,400 stocks that covers Developed 
and Emerging markets and is suitable as the basis for investment products, such as funds, 
derivatives and exchange-traded funds (FTSE Group, 2014). The index was launched in 
2003 with the base date of December 31, 2002.  
The FTSE GACI returns for the period of existence are almost perfectly correlated 
(coefficient of 0.9994, with p-value of 0.000) with MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI), 
comprised of only 2,434 constituents from 44 countries based in Developed and Emerging 
markets, but the historic data for which are available from 1990 (MSCI Inc., 2014), a 
significantly longer timespan.  
The securities weights that FTSE GACI is comprised of are adjusted with coefficients of 2.5 
for European Developed markets (excluding Norway), 1 for the US and Canada, and 1.5 for 
other Developed markets and Emerging markets, following the definitions for Developed 
and Emerging markets of FTSE used for the index formation. The coefficients are multiplied 
by the market capitalization for each index constituent and divided by the total sum of the 
products (Stortinget, 2010).  
The portfolio is also adjusted for the stocks of companies that are not allowed for investing 
according to responsible investing guidelines of the Bank. Moreover, the Fund is not allowed 
to accumulate more than 10% of voting rights of a company. Short-selling is allowed but 
only under condition of the Bank’s access to securities through an established loan scheme. 
Fixed income securities and real estate 
The allocation of fixed income securities prescribed by the Mandate is 30% of corporate and 
70% of sovereign debt securities. The Bank is allowed to invest in government debt 
securities included in Barclays Global Inflation-Linked Index (Series-L), Barclays Global 
Treasury GDP Weighted by Country Index, and all securities placed in the subsection for 
international bonds of Barclays Global Aggregate Index. The weights for government debt 
securities are adjusted according to the Mandate with factor coefficients in regard to 
geographical location and the country’s GDP growth. Corporate fixed income securities 
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allowed for the Fund’s portfolio are those included in Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but 
limited to the following currencies: USD, CAD, EUR, GBP, SEK, DKK, and CHF.  
For real estate, the Bank is expected to deliver, at minimum, the return of Investment 
Property Databank (IPDs) Global Property Benchmark, adjusted for the exclusion of 
Norway, the effects of debt financing and incurred management costs. The upper limit for 
the capital allocation in real estate assets is 5% of the portfolio. 
Risk profiling and performance evaluation 
In addition to expected volatility, the Bank is supposed to place stringent limits on risks 
attributed to credit risk, both at issuer level and overall investment portfolio, liquidity risk, 
counterparty exposure, risks due to debt financing, reinvestment of cash collateral received 
and short selling. The Bank is also responsible for managing overall risk profile of the 
portfolio taking into account qualitative differences in risk profiles for the equity and fixed 
income portfolios and their effect on the total portfolio risk profile. There are also additional 
guidelines for the Banks responsibility regarding the risk management for the real estate 
portfolio along the portfolio’s exposure to countries, sectors, emerging markets, condition, 
designated use, and financing for the real estate assets.  
The Fund’s performance is evaluated against the discussed reference indexes, with the 
adjustments for costs related to operations, transactions, administration and taxes. The Bank 
is also required to report along the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS), a 
framework for the industry performance reporting endorsed and actively promoted by CFA 
Institute. The bank publishes quarter and annual reports audited by a recognized external 
auditing firm that become available to public within some time. 
Management organization 
Since Norges Bank has its primary role as the Norway’s central bank, it was decided to 
create a separate in-house entity responsible for managing the Fund named Norges Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM). The reason for this was to organize the Banks investment 
management activities to reflect the recognized standards for the division of responsibilities 
among the board, the executive officers and administration (Norges Banks Executive Board, 
2011).  
The main principles along which NBIM is envisioned to function are as following. NBIM 
should be organized in a way that ensures that the organization fulfills its mission to 
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safeguard and build wealth for future generations within the framework of the Mandate, and 
NBIM should be organized to ensure an appropriate management structure, including 
adequate risk and control systems and procedures, appropriate for the funds and portfolios 
under management. The organizational structure of NBIM is meant to be based on proper 
segregation of duties, delegated authority and defined areas of responsibility.  
3.2 The Fund’s character as a sovereign wealth fund 
Along the earlier discussion of SWFs, the character of the Fund can be summarized as the 
following. The Fund has long-term investment horizon with the principal objective to further 
increase the national wealth generated by the state revenues coming from the country’s 
natural resources – namely, oil – extraction. High oil prices for the recent two decades 
together with an efficient fiscal structure that secures the collection of revenues through 
appropriate taxation and surplus from state-participated oil extraction and exploration 
activities ensure the Fund’s current rather solid liquidity position. The Fund invests along the 
prescribed by the Norway’s Parliament low-risk profile.  
The management of the Fund has a high degree of independence from the country’s 
department of finance with a right to come up with proposals regarding improvements for 
the Fund’s investment strategy and organizational structure that should be attended to by the 
higher level institutions. The latter can be regarded as a prerequisite for the Fund’s sizable 
flexibility.  
The costs structure of the Fund is rather stringent, and the costs should be reported directly 
to the country’s department of finance. The NBIM’s employees’ compensation has low and 
high limit caps in form of a base fixed annual salary and limits to performance pays (Norges 
Banks Executive Board, 2011). The Fund pursues a public image of a responsible investor 
with a relatively high degree of transparency, it has the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency 
Index of 10 (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014), the highest value the index has.  
The Fund is also required to file its reports in accordance with the GIPS, a framework 
developed as the commercial industry’s performance reporting standard. In addition, the 
Fund cooperates with major organizations when it comes to investing in multinational 
corporations regarding possible illegal activities of the latter, actively participates in research 
for responsible investing, and pays particular attention to the matters of environment. The 
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procedures designed for performance evaluation of the Fund are based on comprehensive 
similar to the commercial funds standards and involve application of benchmarks based on 
popular indexes provided by mainstream vendors, like FTSE and Barclays. 
The overall investment policy for the Fund set forward by the Mandate can be summarized 
as fairly conservative. Again, given the long-term character of the investment horizon, the 
Fund’s management is hardly expected to engage in various types of activities that would be 
based on a short-term gain intuition, like short-momentum speculation, or investing in 
temporarily well performing risky assets, like buying micro-cap technology stocks after a 
minor breakthrough in communications. The management is also expected to avoid all type 
of “overheated” well-performing issues that tend to be heavily overpriced due to attracting 
too much of investors’ and media attention. In other words, the Fund’s management is 
expected to beware any sort of market-herd behavior, sidestep risky investments, and, surely, 
make a decision to invest only in securities with which they are reasonably familiar in order 
to be able to add value in the long perspective. 
3.3 The Fund’s recent performance 
Advancing the discussion in the direction of the Fund’s performance, to begin, the Fund 
ended up the reporting period of 2013 with the total market value of assets equal to 5,038 
billion NOK2, with the actual allocation of 3,107 billion NOK in equities, 1,879 billion NOK 
in fixed income securities, and 52 billion NOK in real estate (Finansdepartement, 2013-
2014). The Fund’s market value (Figure 1) grew by 1,222 billion NOK over the period of 
2013.  
2 For the discussion of the Fund’s performance, the Norwegian krona (NOK) is mostly used, since the Fund reports in NOK 
according to the Mandate. The values are not converted in the USD to avoid inconsistency. 
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Figure 1. The Fund’s market value growth (billion NOK) 
    
Source: Norges Bank 
3.3.1 Return 
The total return for the year 2013 was 15.9%, before adjusting for the management costs, 
and 14.3%, adjusted for inflation and management cost. The dynamics for the Fund’s annual 
nominal return are presented in Figure 2. Table 1 summarizes the Fund’s returns for the last 
period, last 5 years, 10 years and the period of 1998-2013.  
 25 
Figure 2. Annual nominal return, before costs 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
Table 1. Annual returns for the Fund for various periods, geometric 
average, in percent 
 Last year Last 3 years Last 5 years Last 10 years 1998-2013 
Fund, incl. real estate      
Realized return 15.95 8.62 12.03 6.30 5.70 
Inflation 1.39 2.07 2.00 2.14 1.89 
Costs 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Net return 14.29 6.35 9.74 3.98 3.65 
      
Fund, excl. real estate      
Realized return 15.97 8.64 12.04 6.31 5.70 
Benchmark return 14.98 8.31 10.88 6.07 5.39 
Excess return 0.99 0.33 1.16 0.24 0.31 
      
Equity portfolio      
Realized return 26.28 10.77 15.64 7.81 5.66 
Benchmark return 24.99 10.42 14.96 7.33 5.13 
Excess return 1.28 0.34 0.69 0.49 0.53 
      
Fixed income portfolio      
Realized return 0.10 4.55 6.01 4.41 5.03 
Benchmark return -0.15 4.39 4.17 4.20 4.82 
Excess return 0.25 0.16 1.83 0.21 0.21 
      
Equity 
Bonds 
Fund 
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Real estate portfolio      
Realized return 11.79 4.573    
Source: Norges Bank 
The excess return from Table 1, calculated as the difference between the benchmark and the 
realized return, that the Fund reached by the end of 2013, excluding real estate, is 0.99%. For 
the period of 1998-2013, the annualized excess return equals to 0.31%. For the equity 
portfolio, the excess return in 2013 constitutes 1.28% and 0.53% for the period of 1998-
2013. The fixed income portfolio yielded a less generous excess return of 0.25% in 2013 and 
0.21% for 1998-2013. 
3.3.2 Risk 
The standard deviation, a simple measure used by the Norway’s Department of Finance to 
describe volatility, of the Fund’s return in 2013 was 9.3%, which is equal to 470 billion 
NOK in terms of the total market value of the Fund. Figure 3 plots the total Fund’s and 
reference index’s volatilities for dynamic comparison over the period from 1998 to 2013.  
Figure 3. Combined 12-month rolling window standard deviation for the 
Fund and benchmarks 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
3 From April 1, 2011 
Fund 
Benchmark 
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The diagram shows that the Fund’s standard deviation dynamics has been mostly in line with 
the dynamics of the standard deviation for the benchmark. In addition, the Fund’s equity and 
bonds portfolio mostly demonstrated slightly lower riskiness than the riskiness of the 
benchmark for the period of 16 years. 
Table 2 summarizes the risk measures for the Fund. The table also presents third and fourth 
moments of distribution, skewness and kurtosis, in addition to standard deviation. According 
to the latter two, the Fund’s returns do not fit the normal distribution. For each period, the 
returns were negatively skewed, which means that negative returns were more frequent than 
the positive. The distribution of returns is leptokurtic (> 3) for all periods of equity portfolio, 
and for most periods of other portfolios. This means that extreme positive or negative 
outcomes for returns were more probable than for those of the normal distribution. The Fund 
has demonstrated positive excess volatility for each period.  
Table 2. Absolute and excess to benchmarks risk measures for the Fund, 
monthly observations 
 Last year Last 3 years Last 5 years Last 10 years 1998-2013 
Fund, excl. real estate      
Absolute volatility (%) 6.31 7.27 9.01 8.54 7.67 
Excess volatility (%) 0.38 0.37 0.68 0.90 0.75 
Skewness -1.08 -0.60 -0.20 -1.08 -0.96 
Kurtosis 4.04 3.11 2.83 6.85 6.77 
Information ratio 2.62 0.90 1.70 0.27 0.42 
      
Equity portfolio      
Absolute volatility (%) 8.76 12.39 15.05 14.81 15.63 
Excess volatility (%) 0.35 0.43 0.41 0.80 0.85 
Skewness -0.98 -0.70 -0.22 -0.97 -0.80 
Kurtosis 3.92 3.91 3.22 5.57 4.32 
Information ratio 3.71 0.81 1.68 0.61 0.62 
      
Fixed income 
portfolio 
     
Absolute volatility (%) 2.95 2.67 3.42 3.55 3.48 
Excess volatility (%) 0.61 0.45 1.36 1.42 1.13 
Skewness -0.31 -0.33 -0.08 -0.46 -0.41 
Kurtosis 1.91 2.71 3.21 4.57 4.11 
Information ratio 0.41 0.37 1.35 0.15 0.19 
Source: Norges Bank 
The Information Ratio (IR) is a measure of risk-adjusted return comprised of the expected 
active return divided by the tracking error, or the active return’s standard deviation, or as in 
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this case, the excess volatility. IR, unlike the excess volatility is a more meaningful measure, 
as it can be interpreted as the amount of newly taken risk for each unit of excess return. The 
IR for the Fund’s total portfolio for the period of 1998-2013 was close to 0.4, with the IR for 
equities and fixed income portfolios equal to 0.6 and 0.2, respectively.  
3.3.3 Costs 
Management costs, other than performance-based compensation for external managers, 
totaled to 2.2 billion NOK in 2013, which corresponds to 0.05% of the Fund’s average 
market value over the year. The overall management costs, including the performance-based 
compensation for managers, was 2.9 billion NOK, which, adjusted for currency rates 
differences, equals 0.066% of the Fund’s average market value over the year. Figure 4 plots 
the costs encountered by the Fund from 2000 to 2013 in NOK (to the left) and percent basis 
points (1 basis point = 0.01%) with and without performance-based compensation. 
Figure 4. Dynamics for the Fund’s costs, NOK (left), basis points (right axis) 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
From the diagram, it comes clear that the management costs do have an effect on the Fund’s 
performance figures, cutting the Fund’s performance by, roughly, 2-3 basis points each year. 
Performance-based compensation 
Costs excl. performance-based compensation 
 
Basis points incl. performance-based compensation 
 
Basis points excl. performance-based compensation 
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The fixed costs have been rather steadily growing for the entire period. Starting from 2009, 
the performance based compensation has become a substantial part of the management costs, 
and has demonstrated more volatile dynamics than that of the fixed costs. This, perhaps, can 
be explained by the fixed costs being dictated by, primarily, the Fund’s growing size and 
overall market conditions, like, for example inflation. The performance based compensation, 
on the other hand, is at the discretion of the NBIM’s executive board. Observing a strong 
correlation between the Fund’s performance before the compensation costs related to 
performance are excluded, it is possible to conclude that the managers are strongly motivated 
to demonstrate superior performance, although, the performance of the Fund suggests, that 
such a performance comes at a cost. 
Taking into consideration both the dynamics demonstrated by performance, with excess 
returns being only slightly over the benchmark for equity and fixed income portfolios, but, 
nevertheless, steady and, on average, positive over the years, and the evidence that the 
Fund’s management compensation is substantially influenced by superior performance, the 
question on the true quality of the management’s work is hardly not of the primary 
importance to the NBIM’s executive board and the Norway’s ministry of finance.  
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4. Discussion of relative theoretical background  
Although, the Fund has managed to deliver positive returns over the most of the periods, the 
excess returns demonstrated against the predefined benchmarks are hardly impressive. 
Given, although, mostly, positive, but rather insignificant result that can be attributed to the 
actively involved management, a crucial question of how hard it could be for a manager to 
beat the benchmark and deliver positive excess return arises. In addition, the observation of 
the abnormal return for all periods makes one wonder if it is all possible for a large 
investment fund that keeps growing to deliver positive excess returns consistently over time. 
To answer these two fundamental questions, it is essential to begin with a general review of 
the relevant financial theories that attempt to answer what accounts for an investment 
manager’s performance. The overview starts with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, and 
goes on with coverage of other relative influential milestones in academia like Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model, and Multi-factor model. The outline of the 
financial theories also sets up a strong theoretical context for further empirical tests.  
The focus of the theoretical discussion is smoothly shifted from financial models to issues 
that accompany management of an investment fund. Beginning with general coverage of 
methods for evaluation of the management’s performance, the discussion is taken further, 
through various alternatives for fund management strategies, fund management incentives, 
and evidence and rationalization behind imprudent conduct, to concluding that hazards for 
inappropriate managers’ actions due to opportunistic motives or incompetence potentially 
exist for SWFs. Given such exposure, the Fund’s management actions are tested for 
evidence of misdemeanor with the help of the Fund’s and equity markets’ historical data in 
the section that follows.   
4.1 Finance theory 
4.1.1 Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
Perhaps, one of the most fundamental theories that were developed by the academic world 
during the last century and that became a foundation for further advances of the economic 
theory regarding investing practices is the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).  
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The origins of EMH can be traced back as far as the year 1863 when Regnault, a French 
economist and a practicing broker, in his attempt to approach stock market trading 
scientifically, suggested that the stock prices moved randomly. The idea of the so-called 
“random walk” of the stock prices was later developed by Bachelier in his work "The Theory 
of Speculation" (1900), where he modeled the stochastic process of a stock price using 
Brownian motion. Later, Cowles (1933) suggested that professional forecasters of stock 
prices were, in fact, useless. He supported his idea by a simple comparison of portfolios 
modeled according to the forecasters’ advice and portfolios set up by a random selection of 
stocks. This proposition that professional investors could not outperform the market was 
later formalized by Cowles and Jones (1937).  
Starting from the early sixties of the twentieth century, EMH became popularized by Paul 
Samuelson and Eugene Fama. Samuelson (1965) argued that the future contracts are priced 
by rational investors who expect the same spot price outcome in the future. This implied that 
the expected reward for engaging in a transaction of purchasing a contract with the purpose 
of reselling the underlying, or speculative activity, should be equal to zero, or, at most, to 
normal risk premium recognized by the market. Fama (1965) based his work for description 
of stock market prices behavior on the Mandelbrot’s (1963) mathematical framework for 
proving that price changes should be unpredictable. By the time Fama formalized EMH in 
1970, it became a dominant academic framework for further development of asset pricing 
theory, primarily, due to EMH’s main assumption that market agents are, on average, 
rational in their expectations when they price an asset and incorporate the information 
available to market in the asset prices.  
According to Fama (1970), EMH can be stated in three common forms: weak form 
efficiency, semi-strong efficiency, and strong efficiency.  
Weak form efficiency suggests that the present prices incorporate all historic market 
information. This means that the future prices cannot be predicted by analyzing the stock’s 
past. This, also, makes it impossible to earn abnormal returns for those managers who use 
technical analysis in their stock price forecasts, as the technical analysis is based purely on 
analyzing historical patterns of data for the stock’s prices and trading volumes. However, 
under the EMH weak form, there is still room for “beating the market” by those managers 
who use other than readily observable information for their pricing models. Diligent 
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fundamental analysis of the company’s financial, organizational, and strategic planning 
information can give a manager superior knowledge on the future price for a stock.  
This, however, is not possible under semi-strong form of efficiency of markets, where prices 
for stocks constantly adjust to newly available public information in a timely and unbiased 
manner. This means that it is not possible to earn abnormal returns by trading on this 
information, making both technical and fundamental analyses inefficient.  
The third form, which is strong efficiency, in addition to the semi-strong form, suggests that 
the market prices incorporate not only the publicly available information, but also the private 
information of those directly involved with the companies’ management. This implies that, 
under strong market efficiency form, even insiders can’t make excess returns by trading on 
specific information that could, otherwise, be available only to them.  
In addition to this, an important remark should be made here. Although, according to EMH, 
it is believed that the market is always correct in pricing assets, for this, all participating 
individuals should not necessarily be ideally rational. The deviations from the market price, 
however, are assumed to be random, since this ensures that speculators cannot systematically 
exploit the mispricing. 
Generally speaking, under condition of EMH semi-strong and strong forms of efficiency, a 
fund manager can hardly add meaningful value. However, there is still evidence of talented 
managers with outstanding records of delivering positive excess returns to funds for a decent 
period. This could be interpreted in the manner that, although, the market is always right, 
according to EMH, there’s still room for “star” managers who have a decent record of 
systematically beating the market. This is possible due to a truly large number of managers 
competing worldwide, which means that the existence of a few impressively brilliant in the 
extreme right tail of the normal distribution can be, simply, explained by chance.  
EMH validity  
EMH, as of the state for the early 70-s, although, having the market information as its core 
component, did not question how this information is originated. In addition, the mechanisms 
for how the market information is reflected or interpreted are also not taken into account. 
Under EMH, the information on prices is already present when an agent comes to the 
market. Simply speaking, the market agents are viewed not as providers but takers of the 
information.  
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However, undoubtedly, it is the agents that generate the information. To address this rather 
unrealistic inconsistency, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) modeled a market where information 
acquisition comes at a cost. This means that if an investor is there to acquire superior 
information due to, for example, research, this would come at a cost. Abnormal return which 
comes as the result of such costs is, therefore, a premium for superior knowledge, which, in 
its turn is used to cover the incurred costs. This idea suggests that those who run analyses on 
the true value of assets traded in the market, and, therefore, acquire better understanding of 
the true value, push the market price to its equilibrium. This suggests that in the economy 
which is close to being efficient, superior skilled managers can still notice and exploit cases 
of temporary market mispricing. 
EMH validity has been tested with empirical methods numerous times. The majority of tests 
were looking for systematic, statistically significant deviations of prices for assets from that 
of the predicted by the market. Such a systematic deviation from the modeled market price 
was coined as a market anomaly. The largest part of these tests was performed on prices for 
stocks, due to, mainly, availability of reliable historic data from CSRP, a stocks database 
hosted by the University of Chicago starting from the 1970s.  
Market anomalies 
One of the earliest prominent documentations of market anomalies was that the companies 
that had small capitalization systematically outperformed large firms (Banz, 1981). A few 
years later, the January effect was documented by Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983). The 
January effect stands for significantly higher returns that were systematically observed in the 
beginning of a year. The book-to-market effect (Stattman, 1980) was observed as the 
companies that had the value of their equity on their balance sheets higher than the total 
price for their shares on the market outperformed the firms whose equity was valued by the 
market higher than the book value.  
A number of reversal and momentum effects with different time spans were observed in the 
80s and 90s (Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein, 1985), (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985), (Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993). A reversal effect stands for the market agents’ overreaction to extreme news, 
and that it takes some time for the market to correct the price. Momentum effect is the 
evidence that the stocks of those companies that previously outperformed the market have 
better odds for outperforming the market next year, and vice versa, the previous losers have 
higher chances for underperforming in the future. Finally, Bernard and Thomas (1989) 
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demonstrated that buying stocks of the companies that surpassed the expectations for their 
returns by the market can yield positive abnormal return. 
4.1.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
Practically, all tests for EMH validity heavily rely on pricing models used to define the 
correct market prices against which the realized returns are measured to define the excess 
return. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was an important milestone in the development of 
the asset pricing theory.  
APT was proposed by Ross (1976) in his attempt to improve the EMH standings when he 
suggested that arbitrageurs would drive expected return of assets towards the value that is 
consistent with the market equilibrium. Similarly to Grossman and Stiglitz, he allowed for 
exploitation of some opportunities that could lead to earning abnormal returns by managers 
under EMH. Using the arbitrage argument, Ross described the mechanism by which the 
information on asset prices becomes incorporated in the market. In addition to this, there was 
made a valuable conclusion that an arbitrageur will consider the tradeoff between the 
expectation of positive excess return, the risk associated with the position financing, and the 
risk of being wrong. By the logic of risk and reward tradeoff, APT states that the expected 
return of an asset can be modeled as a function of a set of macroeconomic variables to which 
asset’s cash flows are exposed. Given the risks from these factors, the cash flows should be 
discounted by an appropriate discount to obtain a fair price for the asset. This is modeled as 
the linear function of the asset’s change in price over time, i.e. return, and a number of 
independent factors, sensitivity of the return to which is represented by coefficients: 
𝑟𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗1𝐹1 + 𝑏𝑗2𝐹2 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝐹𝑛 + 𝜖𝑗  
where 𝑟𝑗 is a risky asset j return, 𝑎𝑗is a constant for asset j, 𝐹𝑘 is a systematic factor, 𝑏𝑗𝑘 is the 
sensitivity coefficient of the asset j to factor k, 𝜖𝑗 is an idiosyncratic and independently 
distributed error term. 
The factors can be regarded as sources of systematic risk for which an investor should 
receive premiums incorporated in the expected return (𝐸(𝑟𝑗)): 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑏𝑗1𝑅𝑃1 + 𝑏𝑗2𝑅𝑃2 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛 
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where 𝑅𝑃𝑘  is the risk premium of the factor, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate 
APT suggests that the price for an asset derived using this model can be compared to the 
observed market price of the same asset, and if the prices differ, an arbitrageur can exploit 
this inconsistency, and, this way, adjust the market price to the correct level. APT has 
become an instrumental basis that set intuition behind such important frameworks as, for 
example, derivatives pricing models. However, arbitrage has its limits for practical 
implementation as a principal approach to managing an investment fund. The infamous case 
of the Long-Term Capital Management collapse in 1998 was an evident demonstration that 
even if it is possible to define a fair value for an asset before the market truly recognizes this 
value, it is quite impossible to foresee how long it will take for the market to converge. 
4.1.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), is, perhaps, the most iconic asset pricing model both 
in academia and financial industry, and, although, being a predecessor to APT, it can be 
regarded as a special case of APT.  
William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966) are all credited for 
independently introducing CAPM. Their work comes from the earlier works on portfolio 
formation, known as Modern Portfolio Theory, or MPT (Markowitz, 1952). MPT suggested 
that rational investors can diversify away a portion of the risk associated with individual 
securities by including more uncorrelated securities in the portfolio.  
Taking this concept one step ahead, CAPM differentiates the total risk of a security into the 
fraction of risk attributed specifically to a company whose stock is being traded, or 
idiosyncratic risk, and the part of risk that is common to all securities traded in the market, or 
systematic risk. Since all of the securities traded in the market have this same, and, therefore, 
perfectly correlated, portion of systematic risk embedded in them, an investor cannot get rid 
of this risk through diversification. Hence, an investor should be compensated for taking on 
this systematic risk, rather than the total risk of a security.  
CAPM is a linear equation model used to determine a theoretically valid required rate of 
return of an asset according to the asset’s exposure to the systematic, or market risk. The 
measure for sensitivity of a security to the market risk is beta (β), which, along with the 
expected return on the market portfolio (rm) and the return on the risk-free asset (rf), 
 36 
determine the expected return of an asset, and this relation is summarized with the well-
known CAPM formula: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸[𝑟𝑚] − 𝑟𝑓) 
To model the return of the market portfolio, which in the ideal CAPM world is comprised of 
a global portfolio of assets, practitioners use a broad market index, like S&P 500, as a proxy. 
For the risk-free rate, some riskless, often government-backed fixed income security, like 
long-term US Treasure Bonds, is used. The (𝐸[𝑟𝑚] − 𝑟𝑓) part of the formula is also referred 
to as the market premium (RPm) over the riskless return, this means that the formula can be 
restated as: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑚 
The last formula provides a somewhat better intuition for CAPM to be regarded as a single-
factor APT model, where the only factor that defines the riskiness of an asset is its exposure 
to the market. The sensitivity coefficient, beta, is the measure of the asset’s covariance with 
the market relatively to the market’s variance, or: 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑚)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚)  
A more risky stock will have a higher beta, and, therefore, investors will require a higher 
return for taking on the risk that they cannot diversify away. The market’s beta is equal to 1, 
and if the stock is less risky than the market, its beta will be less than 1, with the same 
intuition for a more risky stock, whose beta will be more than 1. A stock’s beta can be 
negative as well. In such a case, this would be a sign that the stock moves in the opposite 
direction of the market’s moves. Such stocks are regarded to be valuable for various 
defensive strategies, as they are considered to provide some hedging to a portfolio against 
the market’s turmoil. A large, well-diversified portfolio, like that of the Fund’s, should have 
riskiness almost identical to the market’s (beta of 1). This also implies that the expected 
return on such a portfolio should be equal to that of the market. 
Graphically, CAPM is represented with the Security Market Line (SML) that is plotted along 
the x-axis of beta and the y-axis of expected return. The correctly priced securities should be 
placed on SML which represents the tradeoff between the systematic risk (beta) and reward. 
CAPM is widely applied for comparing the estimated price for a security with that of the 
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market’s. To do this, an investor should derive the beta for the asset using the market single-
factor model and implement it in the CAPM formula. This, required by the market, return 
should be used to discount the expected cash flows of the security to their present value. The 
resulting sum of the present values of the cash flows should be compared to the observed on 
the market price, and if the observed price is lower than that of predicted by CAPM, the 
asset is regarded to be underpriced and presents an investing opportunity for an investor, 
again, given the assumption that the market will later converge to the theoretically estimated 
price. 
CAPM validity 
CAPM assumes that all investors aim to maximize economic utilities, are rational and risk-
averse, are broadly diversified across a range of investments, are price takers and cannot 
influence prices, can lend and borrow unlimited amounts under the risk-free rate of interest, 
can trade without transaction or taxation costs, deal with securities that are all highly 
divisible and liquid, have homogeneous expectations, and do not encounter information 
asymmetries (Arnold, 2005). These assumptions, evidently, relate back to EMH, and CAPM 
has been tested numerously for empirical evidence for its validity.  
However, an ability to test CAPM for validity has also been questioned. A remarkable work 
by Roll (1977) suggests that it is impossible to test the CAPM validity, under CAPM’s 
original basic assumptions due to inability to observe a global portfolio of assets that should, 
in addition to financial assets, incorporate all other types of assets, including the works of art 
and human capital which are not only hard to quantify, but also impossible to realistically 
correctly price. In addition to this, it has been argued that CAPM could not be supported 
empirically due to, mostly, invalid applications of the model (Fama & French, 2004). 
4.1.4 Multi-factor model 
Returning to the discussion of efficient markets anomalies, it is important to mention that 
most of the tests performed for the empirical evidence for EMH to hold with the discovery of 
anomalies as the result were performed against the benchmarks designed with CAPM. This 
spurred further debates regarding the validity of a model that offers only one factor for the 
risk.  
On the verge of APT developed as a systematic approach to solution for this problem, as 
mentioned earlier, it was suggested that an asset’s sensitivity to multiple factors for 
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systematic risk can be used for deriving the premiums for holding this risk that should be 
incorporated in the return required by investors. Such factors should be universally 
recognized by all investors as risky. It was suggested to include inflation shocks, 
unanticipated shifts in the yield curve, business risk represented by GDP shocks, and 
changes as risk factors in addition to market risk Chen, Roll and Ross (1986).The securities 
not influenced by these risk factors should, therefore, yield the risk-free rate of return, and 
those that are risky should pay premiums appropriate to their exposure.  
There has been a massive debate on how to measure the risk factors proposed by Chen et al, 
as they are quite intuitive from the economic perspective. However, there has been little 
universal concern on robust measures that could be used for practical implementation of the 
multi-factor analyses based on these factors. An obvious reason for this is the nature of the 
listed factors. To be more specific, it is rather challenging to set up appropriate time series 
that would account for shocks relatively smoothly over time in order to, say, use those data 
along daily stock returns. Moreover, most of the statistical procedures would not 
appropriately pick up the effects of those shocks over time due to smoothing and the 
unpredictable, i.e. random, nature of the shocks. 
The observed market anomalies, however, can be viewed as simply premiums for other than 
market systematic – or not diversifiable – risk factors captured by the setups of the empirical 
tests. Indeed, if some strategy readily observed in the market yields systematic premiums 
which have not been immediately corrected for by speculators, this strategy can be 
interpreted as a strong evidence for systematic risk presence that accounts for the premiums. 
In such case, it is hardly the manager’s skill that should be rewarded, and the exposure to 
these risk factors, if they are acceptable for the overall vision for the portfolio’s strategy, 
should be incorporated in the benchmark in order to measure the manager’s performance 
diligently.  
Fama-French three factor model 
Such factors, proven to hold empirically and widely popular today, in addition to market 
factor proposed by CAPM, are the premium for holding small capitalization companies 
stocks over large capitalization (small minus big or “SMB”) and high book-to-market ratio 
firms over low book-to-market (high minus low or “HML”), as offered by Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French (1993). The latter can also be interpreted as the relation between the price 
for one stock of a firm offered by the market and the book value of one share.  
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Perhaps, more intuitive restatement for HML-factor would be with the implementation of 
price-to-book (P/B) ratio which, in essence, is a reciprocal of the book-to-market. In this 
case, high P/B corresponds to low book-to-market. It is also popular to refer to the stock of 
the firms with high P/B as the growth stocks and those with low P/B as the value stocks. The 
intuition behind such classification is that the market is prepared to pay premium for the 
stocks of the companies it believes to have strong (earnings) growth perspectives that are not 
captured by the balance sheet value of the shares. By the same token, value stocks are called 
like this because the market underprices them, and, therefore, there could be unrecognized 
value opportunity for an investor from buying something cheap. Although, the intuition for 
the growth stocks is rather straightforward, one should be rather cautious about believing 
that buying a P/B-underpriced stock is always a good deal. The reference to value stocks 
being underpriced goes back to the famous investing framework developed by Benjamin 
Graham and David Dodd and summarized by Benjamin Graham in Security Analysis (1934). 
In the book, the author argues that in order to derive value from an investment, an investor 
should go long in stock that appear to be underpriced by the market in relation to some of the 
indicators of stock prices attributed to fundamental analysis, as, for example P/B ratio.  
The empirical evidence has demonstrated a rather high explanatory power for SMB and 
HML factors.  
Momentum factor 
In addition to SMB and HML, the momentum factor (“MOM”) was suggested by Carhart 
(1997). Momentum investing strategies had been known previously, as mentioned in the 
overview for the market anomalies, and are based on buying the previous period’s winners 
and shorting the previous period’s losers.  
Summarizing all previously said, the improved multi-factor model can be presented in this 
form: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1�𝐸[𝑟𝑚]− 𝑟𝑓�+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖 
where βk are sensitivity coefficients, or loadings, to the discussed factors, with β0 being the 
intercept for the linear model. An important remark here is that β1 is different from the 
CAPM-derived beta, as the latter incorporates the effects of other factors.  
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The optimal factor loadings can be predefined and incorporated in a portfolio benchmark. 
The portfolio manager’s skill to deliver excess returns will, then, be evaluated against this 
more appropriately adjusted for risk benchmark.  
Given there is neither straightforward evidence for markets being perfectly efficient, nor 
EMH has been fundamentally proven to be wrong, it is possible to conclude that the markets 
are, on average, fairly but not perfectly efficient. In addition, after adjusting a benchmark 
against which abnormal returns are measured for systematic risk factor premiums, a quest for 
systematically positive excess returns becomes extremely challenging.  
4.2 Fund management theory 
From purely financial theories that discuss a setup of market mechanisms in general, the 
discussion’s focus becomes more concentrated on theoretical review of methods for fund 
management which, essentially, build up on the theories overviewed previously. To pick up 
from where the theoretical review of finance theories has been left, there exists a number of 
views on managing a portfolio under various factor models.  
To begin, a simple CAPM-based benchmark incorporates only one rather wide-scope factor 
as a source for systematic risk, the market risk. Under CAPM theory, a manager has two 
basic approaches alternative to merely holding the market portfolio comprised of the assets 
allocated in the same proportion as they should have been allocated in the global portfolio of 
all risky assets.  
First approach is based on the manager’s decision to incorporate more or less market 
portfolio over time. If the decision is to incorporate less in the market portfolio due to, say, 
manager’s expectation of temporary market instability and, therefore, more risk from 
increased volatility and, eventually, poor performance of the market, the weight for the 
riskless asset will be increased. In case of expectation of favorable economic conditions and 
markets growth, a manager can obtain more than 100% exposure to the market by leveraging 
his position through borrowing (theoretically, it is implied that the manager can borrow at 
the risk-free rate, which, clearly, is somewhat unrealistic). Such portfolio management 
approach goes in line with CAPM theory and is intuitively described by moving along SML. 
By diligently performing her economic forecast analyses and responding to the expected 
market conditions appropriately through dynamic shifting between the risk-free rate and the 
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market portfolio, the manager is able to deliver positive excess returns to that of the 
benchmark.  
The second way to approach abnormal returns generation having the end-period results 
evaluated against CAPM benchmark is, actually, deviating from the benchmark. This 
deviation is expressed in setting up the weights for the assets in a manner that is different 
from the market-weighted proportion. In this case, a manager would incorporate more/less 
risk in relation to that of the market without linearly shifting between the market portfolio 
and the risk-free asset as in the first case.  
This latter approach takes us directly to discussing portfolio management under a multiple 
factor model based benchmark. By deviating from the market portfolio weights, a manager, 
in essence, changes the overall risk profile of the portfolio by over-/underweighting stocks 
with higher/lower betas, the measure of market risk. The excess returns to such approach can 
be attributed to the fact that the manager has exposed her portfolio to additional to market 
systematic risk factors and, this way, was able to harvest extra risk premiums. 
Since there exist more than one such well documented systematic risk factor, it makes sense 
to include them in a portfolio’s benchmark. This will not only ensure that the manager’s 
results will be evaluated more properly, but will also give more discretion over the desired 
risk profile to the portfolio’s owner who sets the benchmark.  
In order to deliver positive excess returns under the condition of a multifactor model based 
benchmark, a manager can deviate from the risk factor weights assigned by the benchmark, 
and, this way, take on more systematic risk with the purpose of harvesting premiums 
associated with the risk by the end of the reporting period. This approach can be undesirable 
as it can be regarded as a divergence from the initial portfolio’s mandate set forward by the 
portfolio owner. The benchmark can incorporate some particular risk profile due to 
constraints faced by the owner and increasing risk profile could, therefore, be unfavorable. In 
addition, there exists a possibility of a manager identifying new systematic risk factors that 
are not defined by the benchmark and using them to earn premiums in excess of the 
benchmark’s return. 
Another alternative to delivering abnormal returns, which is believed to be demonstrated by 
truly talented managers, is through selection of stocks that correspond to the risk profile of 
the factors from the benchmark, but yield higher return than that of other similar assets due 
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to being underpriced at the time the manager incorporated it in the portfolio. It is, therefore, 
up to the manager’s ability to spot such undervalued assets, and, then, obtain some sort of 
reasonable assurance that the market will converge to the true price estimate in the future.  
4.2.1 Fund management performance evaluation 
In academia, there has been much research dedicated to finding appropriate measures for 
evaluation of fund management performance. One of the most acknowledged early works 
dedicated to the study of management performance was undertaken by Jensen. In his study 
(Jensen, 1968), he developed the so-called “Jensen’s alpha”, or just “alpha”, which, ever 
since, has become synonymous to positive management performance. Having CAPM as the 
only widely accepted framework for benchmarking in the late 60s, alpha, originally, was the 
difference between the realized return of the portfolio by the end of a period (𝑟𝑖) and the 
expected return for the benchmark defined by the market: 
𝛼𝐽 = 𝑟𝑖 − [𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀�𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓�] 
This way, in the study, Jensen used alpha to account for the return delivered by management 
relative to the portfolio exposure to the market. Having performed his test on 115 mutual in 
mutual funds for the period of 1945-1964, Jensen did not find any significant evidence for 
systematic management outperformance.  
The alpha tests were run later on various samples for funds given different benchmarks. 
Currently popular standard approach is to use Fama-French three factors and Carhart’s 
momentum, all of which are discussed earlier, as systematic risk factors for funds’ alpha 
measure.  
A prominent study of mutual funds performance over the period of 44 years starting from 
1962 by Fama and French (2008) was approached this very same way. The results did not 
turn out to be optimistic for managers as the annual alpha for the sample turned out to be 
around negative 1%, adjusted for the costs. In addition, for the period of 1984-2006 the 
number of outperformers of Fama-French plus momentum factors benchmark in the sample 
distribution was considerably lower than expected under standard statistical assumptions 
(Fama & French, 2010). Other studies on mutual funds have yielded similar results of 
slightly inferior to market performance of mutual funds after adjustment for management 
costs (Wermers, 2000).  
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An important remark should be made here is that most of the studies dedicated to the broad 
question of fund management performance have been revolving around mutual funds 
performance. The primary reasons for this are believed to be their longer endurance over 
time (hedge funds, for example, are a few decades younger), relative homogeneity due to 
similarities of investors and operated markets, and stronger regulation of this kind of 
investment entities due to their direct connection to various pension plan systems. This has 
resulted in accumulation of rather comprehensive well-organized datasets that are more 
available for studies than those for other type of funds.  
The data on SWFs, on the other hand, are relatively young. However, in recent studies, there 
has been evidence that SWFs management performance is not extensively different from that 
of the non-SWF counterparts in long run if adjusted for SWFs specifics like size, liquidity 
and horizon (Kotter & Lel, 2011), (Dewenter, Han, & Malatesta, 2010).  
The differences that still can be observed in the individual performance of stocks of the 
companies that SWFs invest in can be attributed to the SWF’s corporate governance policy 
regarding the investment after the purchase rather than management superior stock-picking 
skills. In other words, it is an SWF’s corporate procedures for actively monitoring firms’ 
executive management that can add up to abnormal performance after the fund becomes 
engaged with the company (Bortolotti, Fotak, & Megginson, 2013).  
4.2.2 Active vs. Passive fund management strategies 
In practice, the manager’s ability to “beat the market” is often referred to as an ability to 
deliver abnormal returns over a low-cost alternative of simply replicating the benchmark 
assets weights for the portfolio. Many benchmarks are readily observable on the market 
through indexes for market portfolios and other popular systematic factors, like size. In 
addition, there exist various financial products readily available on the market that replicate 
major indexes. Buying such product like an ETF that corresponds to the desired benchmark 
can be a cheaper alternative for an investor that doesn’t have much capital to invest, which 
made these products rather popular among private investors. An investing strategy based on 
replication of a benchmark is denoted by so-called “Passive” investing strategy.  
Given the absence of strong evidence for the superior mutual fund management skill and the 
lack of substantial proof that SWF managers demonstrate better results than their mutual 
fund colleagues, an alternative for adoption of Passive strategy by SWFs comes into the 
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daylight rather naturally. Again, it would not be inappropriate to emphasize that the Passive 
strategy for an SWF under discussion here is not based on a benchmark formed on the basis 
of a single factor market model. A definition of the benchmark for an SWF should be 
derived on the basis of the multi-factor model that would specifically be adjusted to SWFs 
according to their size, liquidity and long-term investment horizon.  
Overview of the Fund’s active management strategy  
Such a question regarding the evaluation of the active management strategy of the Fund had 
been asked by Norwegian government previously. This has resulted in a report written by 
Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer (2009).  
In their work, after careful assessment of the results of the Fund, with consideration of its 
specifics, the authors concluded the following. Given the most recent outlook on EMH that 
incorporates costs to obtaining information, transactions costs, financing, agency costs, and 
other real-world frictions, some balance between indexation and active management is the 
right choice. Given the objective of the Fund’s management to deliver passive return based 
on the benchmark predefined by the investing Mandate and the portfolio manager team’s 
task to explore opportunities in order to gain positive excess return over the benchmark, the 
authors list the following factors that should be incorporated in the Fund’s benchmark: term 
structure risk, credit risk, foreign currency risk, value-growth risk, small-large risk, 
momentum risk, and volatility risk.  
For fixed income securities portfolio, term structure risk factor premium is the premium for 
holding longer maturity period securities over the short-period, and the credit risk is based 
on the probability that the borrowing firm will default on its obligations; the higher the 
probability, the higher premium for compensating this risk to an investor should be. Foreign 
currency risk factor is, mostly, a factor for cash holdings and is grounded on an ability to 
obtain premium by going long in currencies with high yields and shorting currencies with 
low yields. For the Fund’s equity securities portfolio, value-growth and small-large factors 
are taken from the HML and SMB Fama-French factor model, and momentum is the 
Carhart’s momentum factor. Finally, volatility premium arises, among other reasons, 
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because “agents are averse to periods of increased volatility and are willing to pay high 
prices to hedge against significant increases in market volatility”4.  
The exposure to these factors should be changed over time, and this dynamic factor weights 
adjustment should account for the active part of managing a portfolio.  
4.2.3 Fund management incentives 
The systematic risk factor premiums, as explicitly discussed before, can be regarded as only 
an attempt to interpret systematically observed returns that excess the return of the market. 
This, naturally, does not mean that they are the only reasons for funds to outperform the 
market.  
A notable alternative to systematic risk factors explanation for a fund’s steady superior 
performance is that it could be this fund’s incentives that motivate managers to do their job 
better. There has been evidence that management incentives matter in mutual funds industry. 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) have empirically tested the relationship between 
management fees and fund performance and found explicitly positive relationship.  
Furthermore, well-performing funds in the past attract more funds from the clients. 
Managers being interested in higher compensation tied to the value of assets under 
management will, therefore, be interested to perform better (Chevalier & Ellison, 1997). 
Moreover, there are indications that the funds where management co-owns the assets 
together with the clients outperform other similar funds where managers are not co-invested 
(Khorana, Servaes, & Wedge, 2007)5.  
4.2.4 Evidence for imprudent fund management 
A paper by Zweig (1997) attracted much attention to the evidence of seasonality in mutual 
funds performance. For the period of 1985-1995, an average equity fund outperformed 
4 Cited from Bakshi and Kapadia (2003), as in Ang et al (2009). 
5 Given the Fund’s owners are citizens of Norway, the Fund managers of Norwegian origin can be regarded as the Fund’s 
co-owners, and, perhaps, be more motivated than the managers of other nationality. Appropriate testing for such systematic 
difference in performance, however, is hardly possible, due to each manager’s individual previous professional experience, 
education and other considerations that should be taken into account. One manager can be better than another simply 
because she has better prior training or possesses some specific expertise in the field of investments she is responsible for. 
In addition, the numbers of total managers and the Norwegian managers employed by the fund would, perhaps, be not 
sufficient for sound statistically significant conclusions. 
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S&P500 by 53 basis points (bp) on the last trading day and underperformed by 37 bp on the 
next day, which is the first day of the next trading period. The outperformance on the last 
day and underperformance on the first day effect was even stronger for the small 
capitalization funds. The data from the funds performance were compared to the appropriate 
stocks indexes. The shifts of the stock indexes did not match the shifts of the funds 
performance, which meant that it was not the stocks fluctuation in prices that was 
accountable for the funds’ abnormal period end results. The explanation for this was that the 
fund managers caused pattern by manipulating year-end valuations of the stocks, or, in other 
words “window dressing” the funds performance for better looks on the period-end reports.  
The suggestion that fund managers engaged in manipulations with the end-period NAV (net 
asset value) in order to beat the benchmark was rigorously tested by Carhart et al (2002).  By 
performing tests for abnormal returns over S&P500 on daily returns data from nine fund 
investment style-based indexes set up by Lipper and their own database of 2,829 mutual 
funds, the authors found strong evidence that equity fund returns, net of the S&P 500, were 
abnormally high on the last day of the quarter, especially the fourth quarter, and abnormally 
low the next day.  
In addition to that, the authors noticed that the top ten overall funds outperformed other 
funds by an extra 42 bp on the last day of the year and underperform these funds by an extra 
29 bp on the subsequent day. Based on subsequent analysis, the authors concluded that this 
was motivated by a desire to demonstrate consistently superior performance by those 
managers who did well previously. 
But why would the managers of the top performing funds engage in the quarter-end window 
dressing on the systematic basis? Should not those managers who used their superior skills 
in the past be able to further demonstrate excellent results consistently?  
4.2.5 Rationalization for management’s imprudent conduct 
Empirical results show that when fund managers’ compensation is linked to relative 
performance, those managers of investment portfolios who are likely to become winners by 
the end of the reporting period might engage in less risky behavior than those managers who 
would realistically not expect to finish first (Brown, Harlow, & Starks, 1996).  
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Fund managers are also more likely to engage in increasing risk behavior if their 
compensation is tied to the funds’ new capital inflows based on the manager’s previous 
year’s performance (Chevalier & Ellison, 1997). Moreover, those funds that have their 
managers compensated for running low-risk strategies gradually transit to holding more 
government issued securities at the time close to disclosure periods. This is because the 
government issues, generally, have lower volatility profile which makes them account for a 
safer strategy, for which the management gets better compensated (Musto, 1997).  
An explanation supported by the evidence is that the management performance deteriorates 
as the scale of the fund grows. Perold and Solomon (1991) argue that the reason for this 
could be larger transaction costs as the positions of a fund become larger with the attraction 
of new capital. In addition to this, they argue that as the size of the fund grows, at some 
point, the costs of additional trading exceed the opportunity cost of not trading. Their 
conclusion is that if the management fee is tied to the percentage of assets value under 
management, the managers will pass on many smaller trading opportunities in order to avoid 
trading costs.  
The observation that managerial ability to deliver excess return is convexly related to the 
fund’s size was also rationalized and empirically proven by Berk and Green (2004). The 
general rationale behind this relation is that the management talent is a scarce resource which 
gets simply dissolved as the size of capital flow increases. Apparently, as the past superior 
results attract more capital, the manager feels more challenged to demonstrate excellent 
outcome given the challenges of the larger capital size and the higher pressure from not only 
the old but also the new investors whose expectations for the return, in addition to that, have 
been updated upwards by the previous success.  
The haste for demonstration of positive abnormal returns, given limits for management skills 
and an incentives system tied to the current performance, can develop into a strong 
motivation for managers to cheat by window dressing the results of their performance.  
4.2.6 Hazards of manager’s imprudent conduct for sovereign 
wealth funds 
The described problem of window dressing is particularly acute for SWFs. As discussed 
earlier, the SWFs size has been continuously growing for the last decades at a rather rapid 
pace. Moreover, constant inflow of funds from the owning countries’ revenue sources is in 
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the SWFs core nature. This is an essential difference between investment institutions 
competing for investor clients in the market-based environment.  
Moreover, managers who get employed by SWFs, most usually, come from commercial 
funds. This means that they are used to working under commercial conditions, and the 
results which they demonstrated in the past, which could have been the reason for hiring 
them for an SWF on the first place, will not necessarily be demonstrated during involvement 
with the SWF. In addition, management is hardly in position of controlling the inflows of 
capital in SWFs, and, simply, can’t refuse signing in another client in order to preserve an 
optimal balance of expertise and the fund size.  
Furthermore, the market-based incentives system employed by most of the commercial funds 
that operate in the competitive environment and targeted at attracting new customers with 
demonstration of superior to rival’s performance is not appropriate for SWFs. However, 
most of the SWFs offer performance-based compensation in addition to a fixed salary for the 
management, which is also the case of the Fund (Norges Banks Executive Board, 2011). 
These major discrepancies in the SWFs organizational structures have an enormous potential 
for creating a situation where an SWF management can’t deliver the expected performance 
due to SWFs specifics and is still being compensated relatively to the results demonstrated at 
the end of the disclosure period. This evident inconsistency can become a strong motivation 
for window dressing of the reporting period-end results by SWF managers.  
In addition to acting opportunistically in order to demonstrate superior performance and, as 
the result, obtain some personal benefits, an SWF’s management can be not diligent in 
execution of the fund’s investment strategy without a self-benefitting motive. Such 
inappropriate attitude can be the result of a number of reasons.  
Besides a manager’s incompetence due to the fund’s growth in size, specific SWFs’ related 
tasks that the manager should address can become another reason for not coping with the 
duties appropriately. In a situation like this, a manager simply might not know how to 
accomplish the tasks set out by the fund, as those tasks are nothing like what she has been 
doing previously in the commercial industry. Another possibility is that the methods used in 
the industry for accomplishing similar tasks can turn out to be either inappropriate or just 
ineffective.    
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Moreover, an SWF’s structural setup can become a reason for managers’ negligence. It 
could be a poorly thought through compensation system that does not motivate, but rather 
discourages a manager to perform diligently. As an example, the internal fund’s bureaucracy 
can penalize initiative in some way. Or it could be a lack of control due to corporate charter 
loopholes of which a manager is aware that would allow her to get away with irresponsible 
conduct. 
Given the Fund’s uniqueness, its largest SWF capital position in the world with the steady 
inflows of funds on a regular basis, and the incentives for competition among the Fund’s 
managers due to the adopted compensation system, the risk that the Fund’s management 
might engage in opportunistic activities or become indiscreet in execution of the Fund’s 
investment strategy along the Mandate’s guidelines for other than opportunistic reasons is 
potentially present. 
 50 
5. Empirical assessment of the Fund’s 
management prudence 
In order to investigate whether the Fund’s managers do their job thoroughly, firstly, two tests 
for opportunistic conduct are performed. Then, the management’s diligence for the Fund’s 
strategy execution is assessed with the help of another six tests.  
5.1 Data 
The empirical tests are performed on the Fund’s equity portfolio historical data. Since the 
Fund does not disclose fixed income or real estate holdings on a regular basis to some public 
service in some standardized manner, like the US SEC in the case of equity holdings, it was 
hardly possible to incorporate non-equity portfolios of the Fund in the analysis.  
To obtain the data on the Fund’s equity securities positions, Norges Bank’s 13F-HR 
quarterly reports were used. The stocks that are reported on form 13F-HR are those that are 
on the list of "Section 13(f) securities" 6 (US SEC, 2014). The reports were downloaded from 
the US SEC website (www.sec.gov) that uses EDGAR browsing system to locate the needed 
documents. Each report contains the information on the Fund’s equity holdings with, among 
other details, specifications for the securities’ issuer, class, CUSIP, market value of the total 
value of stock holdings and the number of shares owned for the end of the day of the last day 
of the reporting period (quarter end).    
The data for each individual stock were accessed using Bloomberg terminal. With the help 
of CUSIP of each stock from the 13F-HR reports, historic closing prices for the end of the 
trading week, market capitalization, P/B ratios, country of origin, and principal sector of 
operations were obtained for the total number of 3,213 stocks. The Fund’s holdings, as 
represented by the data, are described in more detail in Appendix 1 and graphically 
summarized in Figure 5. 
6 The list is published quarterly. "Section 13(f) securities" are defined by Rule 13f-1(c) and is made available to the public 
pursuant to Section 13 (f) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
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Figure 5. Summary of the Fund’s holdings value and stocks (number of 
firms) as represented by the data 
 
As demonstrated by the diagram, the value of the Fund’s equity portfolio holdings, as given 
by the data, ranges from 586.6 million (USD) in the beginning of the period to 131.6 billion. 
The number of companies included in the data ranges from 369 to 1,951. Further dynamics 
in the Fund’s holdings, as well as additional details for stocks owned by the Fund and the 
Fund’s trading history are covered along the overviews of methodologies for the empirical 
tests. Such general organization of the analysis ensures both information consistency and 
logical flow of the discussion. 
For the data on the indexes that were used for the empirical tests setup, MSCI ACWI and the 
MSCI ACWI family indexes for 10 sectors, 3 company sizes and 2 investment styles were 
used. In particular, for firms size: MSCI AC World Index Large Cap, MSCI AC World 
Index Mid Cap, and MSCI AC World Index Small Cap indexes; for investment styles: MSCI 
AC World Growth and Value indexes; for sectors: MSCI AC World Energy, Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, 
Information Technology, Telecommunication, and Utilities Sector indexes. The weekly price 
quotes for each index were accessed using Bloomberg terminal. In addition, MSCI ACWI 
Momentum index weekly price quotes and the US Treasury 10-year weekly bonds yields 
were obtained from Datastream. 
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
st
oc
ks
 (n
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s)
0
50
10
0
15
0
va
lu
e 
(b
ill
io
n,
U
S
D
)
2000q3 2003q3 2006q3 2009q3 2012q3
year quarter
value stocks
 52 
The classification for sector indexes and stocks’ industry and sector are set up in accordance 
with the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) that was developed by MSCI and 
Standard & Poor's. All data used for the empirical tests are for the period of 12 years from 
2001 to 2012 and the currency used is USD. The data was adjusted and processed using MS 
Excel, Visual Basic (VBA) and Stata statistical package software.  
5.2 Testing for opportunistic conduct 
To examine opportunistic conduct of the Fund’s management, first, a test for significant 
difference of abnormal returns for the weeks of the beginning and the end of each month, 
quarter, and year is performed. Then, the data are tested for significant difference of 
abnormal returns between the reporting week and each of the rest of the weeks in order to 
assess a hypothesis that there might exist some other than articulated by the first test pattern 
for investment decisions with a purpose of demonstration of abnormal performance for 
periods other than reporting dates. 
A noteworthy challenge for the tests setup was to appropriately model the Fund’s returns 
over the periods between the reported dates, as these data are not readily available for public 
access. To address this problem appropriately, three portfolios are constructed using 
different methods in order to replicate the Fund’s returns time series properly. Together with 
the setup of the replicated portfolios, some appropriate results regarding the Fund’s portfolio 
allocations are deliberated upon along the theoretical background presented earlier. Each of 
the tests is performed on each of the three replicated portfolios and the results are compared 
to each other and discussed.  
5.2.1 Methodology 
In order to discuss the dynamics of the Fund’s investments during the 12 years period, and, 
eventually, empirically test for signs of the Fund’s management opportunistic conduct, the 
time series for the Fund’s weekly returns need to be constructed. The precision of the tests 
would, undoubtedly, be improved given it could be possible to obtain trustful information for 
the Fund’s daily returns. However, since the Fund reports on quarterly basis, the 
approximations for the Fund’s time series on the weekly basis introduce significantly less 
noise than if the time series for the Fund’s performance were set up as daily returns.  
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To simulate the weekly returns of the Fund’s equity portfolio, three replicating portfolios 
have been set up. The Fund’s portfolio could hardly be replicated by imitating the holdings 
based on weighting individual stocks from year to year, as the Fund keeps buying and selling 
stocks between two reporting dates. A large allocation in one particular stock would be 
simply not observed if the position was changed closer to the reporting period. Hence, the 
portfolio should be replicated along steady equity factors that are constantly present for the 
entire period of replication. 
Each replicating portfolio uses specific attributes of stocks that can be related to the 
appropriate MSCI’s indexes. The decision for the broad categories for stocks on which the 
replicating portfolios should be constructed was based on two important criteria. Firstly, a 
specific attribute for each broad category should be objectively identified as a unique 
attribute that excludes other attributes of the category. The second criterion is that the 
categories should be widely recognized and an appropriate index historic time series can be 
readily accessed.  
In addition, having MSCI ACWI index as the Fund’s equity portfolio benchmark and using 
other MSCI indexes for categories’ attributes that are constructed based on the MSCI’s All 
World that includes both Developing and Emerging markets (“All World” and “ACWI” are 
essentially the same) ensures consistency of the results. This is another important reason, 
besides the correlation of almost equal to 1 (0.999) between FTSE GACI, the index used as 
the Fund’s benchmark in the Mandate, and MSCI ACWI for deciding to use MSCI ACWI as 
the Fund’s and the Fund’s replicated portfolios’ benchmark further on. 
As mentioned, there are three approaches to replicating portfolios. The stocks are 
categorized into broader groups according to the criteria discussed above. One group is the 
size of the companies based on their market capitalization. Next group is the broad 
investment style that the firms can be attributed to. Finally, the firms are sorted by the 
primary sector of economy in which they operate.  
The capital allocation weights are defined for each attribute within each of the three groups, 
where one group constitutes 100% of the portfolio. For example, the weight of the stocks 
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invested in Canada7 is defined relatively to other countries, where all countries are one group 
that is equal to 100%. These relative weights for each attribute are then used to replicate the 
Fund’s weekly returns by assigning these weights to an appropriate index according to the 
attribute. Continuing the earlier example, if the Fund’s holdings invested in Canada are 10%, 
these same 10% are assigned to an appropriate index that represents Canadian market.  
Since the aim is to replicate the Fund’s returns over the periods between the reporting dates8, 
the attributes weighting should be dynamic in order to reflect the changes in the attributes 
weighting over time. A simple, but not dynamic alternative to account for the change is to 
take the average for the attribute’s weights between two dates. For dynamic weighting, the 
in-between number of weeks is estimated. Since there are two time dates for which the 
attribute weights are observed, the reference reporting date and the next reporting date, it is 
plausible to assume that the next week’s period after the reference date should have weights 
for the stocks’ attributes closer to those of the reference date rather than the next reporting 
date.  
To incorporate this effect in the model for the replicating portfolios, the attribute weights 
from the next reporting date are weighted by the number of weeks starting from the 
reference period, and the reference date weights are weighted by the number of weeks 
remaining to the next reporting date. These products are, then, added up and averaged across 
the total number of weeks between the two reporting dates. The formula for dynamic 
weighting for one attribute on week i after the reference period t can be presented in the 
following way: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1 × 𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 × (𝑁 − 𝑖)𝑁  
where N is the total number of weeks between the periods.  
7 A country-based example here is only for clarification purposes; country attributes are not used in the replicating 
portfolios setup.  
8 Some 13F-HR reports have reporting dates that are not end of week (like other time series weekly data used throughout 
the analyses) or trading days (e.g. weekends, holidays), as the calendar end-of-quarter days are required for reporting; for 
consistency, the reporting dates were adjusted in the following manner: if the reporting date is Saturday, Sunday or Monday 
it is taken back to the preceding Friday, if it is on other days of the week, it is taken to the following Friday. 
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Again, using the previous example, if Canada on the reference reporting date (wt) is 10% of 
all the countries, and only 5% on the next reporting date (wt+1), having 12 weeks between the 
quarter ends (N) when the reports become available, for the week 2 after the reference date, 
Canada is assigned the weight of: 5% × 2 + 10% × (12 − 2)12 = 9.167% 
For the given week, Canada index is multiplied by 9.167% to reflect the dynamic change in 
the Canada-attribute weighting for the replicating portfolio. Gradually, Canada’s weight will 
be closer to 5% until it is, actually, equal to 5% on the day of the next reporting period.  
Size portfolio 
The first replicating portfolio is set based on the size of the firms that were listed in the 
Fund’s quarterly reports. All stocks are sorted into three size categories according to their 
market capitalization: Large, Mid, and Small. Such categorization of stocks based on their 
size is chosen because size is a stock’s property that can be objectively identified as a unique 
attribute. Moreover, since size is one of the widely recognized systematic risk factors from 
Fama-French three factor model, which is commonly used for benchmarking and other 
purposes in the industry, appropriate indexes for Large, Mid and Small capitalization stocks 
are readily available from MSCI.  
To assign each stock held in the Fund’s equity portfolio a proper attribute of its size, an 
approach somewhat different from the original one (Fama & French, 1993), which has only 
small and large size stocks defined around the stocks sample median, was implemented. The 
average market capitalization of the stocks included in the MSCI ACWI over 12 years period 
was readily obtained from Bloomberg. Then, leaning on the MSCI’s methodology of 
defining 70% of the world’s stocks as large, 15% as mid, and 15% as small capitalization as 
proxy, the 15- and 30-percentiles for the sample were estimated. After that, all stocks whose 
market capitalization is less that 15-percentile, which is equal to 8,582.72 million, were 
assigned the attribute of small size, and all stocks whose market capitalization is more that 
30-percentile, equal to 9,514.38 million, were denoted as large size. All the remaining stocks 
whose market capitalization falls in the interval between 15- and 30-percentiles fall into the 
category of mid-size. The summary for the categorization of the Fund’s equity holdings by 
size is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Summary for the Fund’s holdings categorized by size 
Attribute Number 
of firms 
Percentage of 
total number 
of firms 
Average 
percentage of the 
Fund’s total 
capitalization 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Large 462 14.38% 79.40% 6.91% 69.70% 90.70% 
Mid 35 1.09% 1.50% 0.30% 0.84% 2.57% 
Small 2,716 84.53% 19.1% 6.86% 8.13% 28.60% 
 
From the summary table it comes clear that, although, 84.53% of the total number of firms 
was small capitalization companies, the Fund has been mostly investing in large 
capitalization firms. For the period of 12 years, on average, large companies accounted for 
79.40% of the Fund’s total capitalization, small companies for 19.1%, and mid-cap firms for 
only 1.50%. The standard deviation is close to zero for mid-cap firms, and the maximum and 
minimum percentage of the Fund’s total capitalization for the period is 0.84% and 2.57%, 
respectively. The Fund’s maximum allocation of capital in large firms stocks is 90.70% and 
the minimum is 6.91%. For small firms the maximum is 28.60% and the minimum is 6.86%. 
The dynamic change in weights for each attribute is graphically presented on Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Dynamics for the Fund’s holdings categorized by size 
 
Figure 6 gives a rather evident picture for the dynamics of the Fund’s attitude towards the 
systematic risk factor of the firms’ size. Again, referring to SMB factor in the Fama-French 
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model, it can be concluded that the recent trend in the increase of the Fund’s equity portfolio 
allocation of capital in small-cap stocks is aimed at harvesting the premium from the 
aforementioned systematic risk factor. 
Using the dynamic weights for the size attributes for stocks and MSCI AC World indexes for 
large, mid, and small capitalization stocks respectively, the size-based replicating portfolio 
for the Fund’s equity portfolio (“Size portfolio”) is constructed.  
Style portfolio 
For the next portfolio, a style attribute of a stock is used as the basis for category formation. 
The idea for the investment style has already been tackled in the relevant theory discussion 
section. The stocks are assigned an attribute of growth, core or value, based on its average 
P/B ratio. Each attribute is also objectively identified as a unique property of a stock and 
there exist appropriate indexes that can be accessed easily.  
The idea for the stocks style is based on the Fama-French HML factor that accounts for 
premium for holding stocks of underpriced firms. Although, the original approach is based 
on the book-to-market ratio, the P/B ratio is, in essence, the reciprocal for book-to-market 
which, perhaps, for its simple intuitive appeal, is more widely used in the industry. The P/B, 
as discussed, is a fundamental analysis indicator that shows if the stock is overpriced by the 
market relatively to the book value of the company’s per share residual after the debt, and 
other relevant obligations are satisfied.  
A simple rule of thumb that if P/B is higher than 1 than this is an indication of a stock being 
overpriced by the market is hardly the most appropriate way for categorization. The reason 
for this is that different industries have different perspectives, dynamics and market agents’ 
outlooks on growth. All this is incorporated in the stock prices and, subsequently, in P/B 
ratios.  
In order to incorporate the differences in P/B ratios throughout different industries 
consistently in the replicating portfolio based on the investment style, the industries average 
P/B ratios were downloaded from A. Damodaran’s website9 and used as proxy for definition 
of the stocks’ investment style attributes (Appendix 2). Each stock’s P/B is averaged for the 
9 Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/pbvdata.html (accessed May 4, 2014) 
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period of 12 years, then, the average is compared to that of the firm’s industry. If the firm’s 
P/B ratio is two times larger than the P/B ratio of the relative industry, it is assigned the 
attribute of growth; if the average P/B ratio is two times less than its industry’s P/B ratio, 
then the stock is assigned the attribute of value. The rest of the stocks are entitled to be core 
stocks as they represent the industry average P/B ratio, and, therefore, are not significantly 
over- or underpriced.  
According to Benjamin Graham, the father of the Value Investing, an investor should have a 
particular number, or “margin of safety” when scanning the market for undervalued 
opportunities. His suggestion that the speculative stock should be paid 50 cents for a dollar 
and 90 cents for a dollar of a high-grade investment stock (Graham, 1934) back in 1930s did 
not include an adjustment for different industries, nor were the stock industries growth 
expectations so fundamentally diverse as they are today. The factor of 2 for the industry’s 
average P/B is, surely, somewhat arguable, but is believed to be a decent neutral-
conservative approximation. The resulting Fund’s summary for holdings is presented in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary for the Fund’s holdings categorized by style 
Attribute Number 
of firms 
Percentage of 
total number 
of firms 
Average 
percentage of the 
Fund’s total 
capitalization 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Core 2,645 82.32% 84.60% 1.81% 80.50% 88.80% 
Growth 472 14.69% 11.30% 1.87% 8.22% 15.70% 
Value 96 2.99% 4.12% 0.95% 1.69% 6.24% 
 
From the table, it can be concluded that the Fund has steadily been invested in the core 
stocks, which comprise 84.60% average percentage of the Fund’s total capitalization with 
the minimum of 80.50% and maximum of 88.80%. This shouldn’t come as a surprise given 
the Fund’s large size, rather risk-averse investment mandate tied closely to the world-wide 
benchmark performance, and relative scarcity of reasonably underpriced value stocks. The 
dispersion for each of the stock attributes is not very high either, with standard deviation of 
1.81%, 1.87%, and 0.95% for core, growth, and value stocks, respectively. The Fund is 
invested, on average in 11.30% of growth stocks with the maximum and minimum of 8.22% 
and 15.70%, respectively, and 4.12% in value stocks with the maximum equal to 6.24% and 
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the minimum of 1.69%. How the weights in each style category changed over the 12 year 
period can be observed on Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Dynamics for the Fund’s holdings categorized by style 
 
The conclusions about relatively stable change in the weights for the style attributes over 
time, made in the previous paragraph due to low standard deviation, are supported by the 
diagram. A noticeable but not dramatic change can still be observed starting from the second 
half of 2010, when the Fund gradually began to increase its position in growth stocks at the 
cost of the core stocks. This, perhaps, can be explained by the Fund’s objective to harvest 
risk premium from the stocks with high growth perspectives given the Fund’s low liquidity 
constraints. In a sense, therefore, this should be regarded as a liquidity premium, rather than 
management engagement in speculative behavior due to the market’s positive outlooks and 
higher P/B ratios for the stocks. 
Having the weights for the style-based attributes for stocks defined at hand, a portfolio 
replicating the Fund’s investment style (“Style portfolio”) can be finalized. The weights are 
assigned to MSCI’s value and growth indexes for growth and value, and MSCI ACWI for 
core stocks.  
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Sector portfolio 
The following Fund’s replicating portfolio is constructed with the stocks sector being a 
principal attribute by which each stock is categorized. A principal sector of a firm’s business 
operations is a unique identifiable attribute of a stock. A sector is a broader category than an 
industry which perfectly suits the purpose of constructing a replicating portfolio for the Fund 
as it is easier to categorize firms with different degrees of diversification of operations by 
sectors without overlapping. Moreover, since many practitioners and academics constantly 
monitor performance of one sector over another, proper indexes that can be used for setting 
up the replicating portfolio are readily available.  
This interest to sectors performance can be explained by a widely recognized approach to 
portfolio diversification by sectors of economy. Since for the last twenty years or so national 
markets have become rather well integrated, and, therefore, highly correlated with each 
other, risk managers attended more often to an alternative to countries diversification 
approach of hedging risk with positions in different sectors. Important reasons for this are 
that correlation among sectors is lower than between countries and transaction costs for 
shifting among sectors can also be significantly lower than if shifting internationally. 
Moreover, there are other risks connected with a foreign country’s political situation and 
regulation, whereas, for sector rotation, one can stay invested in one country’s market at any 
time, given all sectors are well presented there.  
At the sector diversification foundation, there lies the intuition that it is, simply, the nature of 
economy that all sectors can hardly do well at one time. A more formal explanation for 
sector diversification as not only means of hedging risk but also shifting portfolio positions 
to various economic risk factors in order to arbitrage associated with the risk premiums is 
provided by APT, as it has been discussed in the relative theory overview section earlier.  
The summary for the Fund’s holdings classified by sectors in accordance with GICS is 
presented in Table 5 and Figure 8 graphically presents average percentage of the Fund’s total 
capitalization for each sector. 
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Table 5. Summary for the Fund’s holdings categorized by sector 
Attribute Number 
of firms 
Percentage 
of total 
number of 
firms 
Average 
percentage 
of the Fund’s 
total 
capitalization 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Communications 249 7.66% 7.15% 0.99% 5.39% 9.76% 
Consumer 
Discretionary 479 14.91% 8.67% 1.19% 5.41% 10.66% 
Consumer 
Staples 142 4.42% 9.66% 2.22% 6.06% 14.71% 
Energy 253 7.87% 10.73% 3.50% 4.65% 17.36% 
Financials 646 20.11% 19.61% 2.18% 12.82% 23.38% 
Health Care 352 10.96% 11.11% 2.98% 5.83% 16.17% 
Industrials 303 9.43% 9.47% 1.62% 6.09% 14.76% 
Materials 237 7.38% 4.98% 1.00% 2.44% 6.80% 
Technology 450 14.01% 15.71% 2.21% 11.66% 23.70% 
Utilities 105 3.27% 2.93% 0.64% 1.70% 4.20% 
 
Figure 8. Average percentage of the Fund’s total capitalization by sectors 
(rounded to percent units) 
 
For the period of 12 years, the Fund has been well diversified among the ten listed sectors. 
The most noticeable holdings that the Fund had were in the sectors of Financials (being the 
highest with 19.61% average allocation), Technology, Health Care and Energy with the 
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average allocation of over 10% in each. The lowest average weight among the sectors is the 
weight for Utilities sector with only 2.93%. This position in Utilities sector, has, however, 
been the most stable over time, with standard deviation of 0.64% and the minimum and 
maximum positions corresponding to 1.70% and 4.20%, respectively. Energy sector, on the 
other hand, has the highest standard deviation of all, 3.50%, and with the minimum and 
maximum weights in the Fund’s portfolio ranging from 1.70% to 4.20%. Other sectors’ 
standard deviations are in the range between that of the Utilities and Energy with allocations, 
apart from those already mentioned, varying between 5% and 10%.  
An insightful picture of the dynamics in sectors allocation over the 12 year period is 
presented in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Dynamics for the Fund’s holdings categorized by sector 
 
Over the period, the Fund had relatively stable positions in Utilities, Materials and 
Communications. The positions for Financials changed for the time period rather 
dramatically, with less than 15% in the beginning of 2002, the peak in January 2006 and 
noticeable slip to 15% from around 18% second half of 2008 – first half of 2009, evidently, 
due to the Financial Crisis. Since then, the Fund gradually increased its positions in the 
Financial sector. The allocations to Energy sector, on the other hand have been gradually 
decreasing after the Financial Crisis. This, can be explained by not only reduction in global 
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demand for energy sources due to the downturn in the economic cycle, but, also, perhaps, the 
need to reduce the overall Fund’s exposure to the Energy sector due to the Norway’s high 
general dependency on the oil and gas related industries. 
Using the weights for each sector and sector-corresponding MSCI indexes, the Fund’s equity 
portfolio replicated by the stocks’ sector attribute (“Sector portfolio”) can be constructed.  
Overview of replicated portfolios 
A comparison of the Fund’s three replicated portfolios to each other and the benchmark is 
provided below. All three portfolios, as expected, are significantly highly correlated with 
each other and with the benchmark (the correlations matrix is presented in Table 6), with 
Style portfolio’s correlation being almost equal to 1. This is not surprising given that, on 
average throughout the period, the Fund was invested around 85% in core stocks that are 
reproduced in the Style portfolio with the help of the benchmark. 
Table 6. Correlation matrix for replicated portfolios and the benchmark 
 Size Style Sector Benchmark 
Size 1    
Style 0.9992 1   
Sector 0.9983 0.9991 1  
Benchmark 0.9991 0.9999 0.9989 1 
 
Same conclusion regarding the similarities among portfolios and the benchmark, with 
particular match between the benchmark and Style portfolio, comes from analyzing the 
summary statistics for replicated portfolios and the benchmark (Table 7). For 626 weeks of 
observations, the average weekly return for the benchmark and Style portfolio is 0.024% 
with the standard deviation of 2.680% for benchmark and 2.678% for Style portfolio. A 
slight over-performance of Size portfolio with 0.028% mean weekly return is observed. This, 
perhaps, is due to more volatility exposure coming from the small capitalization stocks and 
the resulting highest of all four standard deviation of 2.682%. A slight under-performance, 
on the other hand, is demonstrated by Sector portfolio with the mean weekly return of 
0.021%, and the lowest standard deviation equal to 2.669%, but with the highest difference 
between the minimum (-22.240%) and maximum (11.870%) realizations due to sector 
rotation sensitivity to extreme events in the economic cycles. 
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Table 7. Summary statistics for replicated portfolios and the benchmark 
 Number of weeks Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Benchmark 626 0.024% 2.680% -22.400% 11.700% 
Size 626 0.028% 2.682% -21.860% 11.530% 
Style 626 0.024% 2.678% -22.250% 11.570% 
Sector 626 0.021% 2.669% -22.240% 11.870% 
 
Excess returns for each of the replicating portfolios, or alpha, are discussed further on. To 
obtain the portfolios’ abnormal returns, benchmark returns are subtracted from each portfolio 
corresponding weekly returns throughout the 12 year period. The abnormal returns are not 
adjusted for systematic factors, mainly, to imitate the original benchmark set forward by the 
Mandate. In addition, be there such an adjustment, the individual effects from each portfolio 
would be significantly smoothened, which would deprive some of the explanatory value that 
each individual portfolio has. In other words, it would be much harder to trace the origin of 
abnormal systematic performance to one of the factors using differences among replicating 
portfolios due to their setups after the adjustment and verify the Fund’s management 
transgression over the abnormal returns, should, of course, such abnormal returns be 
detected.  
Statistical summary for the three portfolios’ abnormal returns is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Summary for portfolios abnormal returns 
Portfolio Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Size 0.004% 0.116% -0.525% 0.541% 
Style -0.019% 3.27% -19.3% 16.1% 
Sector -0.27% 12.7% -71.7% 60.2% 
 
The abnormal returns of the Size portfolio are only slightly different from zero, with the 
average mean of 0.004% and relatively high volatility of 0.116%. The highest abnormal 
return is equal to 0.541% and the lowest is -0.525%.  
Style portfolio’s abnormal returns, just like the abnormal returns of Size portfolio, are close 
to zero, although, on average, they are negative. The dispersion around the mean is 
significantly higher for Style portfolio than for Size portfolio, given the standard deviation of 
3.27% and the minimum of negative 19.3% and the maximum of 16.1% gain for one week. 
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High variance in Style portfolio’s abnormal returns can, perhaps, be explained by portfolio’s 
exposure to growth stocks. Growth stocks are not only highly volatile, but also rather 
sensitive to the market fluctuations, in particular, to periods of extreme growth or negative 
shocks.  
The abnormal returns average for Sector portfolio, as in Style and Size portfolios, is close to 
zero, but negative, as in the Style portfolio’s case that had -0.019% of abnormal average 
return. The standard deviation of 12.7% is, by far, much higher than the standard deviation 
of Size (only 0.116%) and Style (3.27%) portfolios. Such a high dispersion is the result of 
significant swings in the excess weekly Sector portfolio returns ranging from negative 71.7% 
to positive 60.2%. Such enormous weekly returns can be explained by extreme sensitivity of 
a portfolio set on the sector rotation principles to investment timing. Given the presence of 
periods of high market volatility, in particular, the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, wrong 
timing for sector rebalancing can become rather costly, whereas, a correct outlook on a 
number of macroeconomic perspectives when moving capital from one sector to another can 
become fairly rewarding. 
Eventually, having abnormal returns time series10 for the Fund’s replicating portfolios ready, 
it is possible to proceed to the next stage. This next section consists of two parts. Each part is 
dedicated to testing a zero-hypothesis on presence of empirical evidence for window 
dressing of the Fund’s abnormal performance results at various points in time, with 
particular attention to month, quarter and year end periods.  
The first test examines the differences in abnormal weekly returns around known reporting 
periods, in particular, first and last weeks of months, first and last weeks of quarters, and first 
and last weeks of years. The second test tests for the patterns for abnormal returns in all of 
the weekly returns, as reporting periods other than used in the first test can also exist due to, 
for example, internal disclosure of performance results.  
10 The portfolios abnormal returns time series were tested for stationarity. The performed unit-root test was Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979), (Elliott, Rothenberg, & Stock, 1996) with trend for a number of lags. The zero-
hypothesis for the unit-root presence was rejected at 1% level of confidence for number of lags from 1 to 6. Please, see 
Appendix 3 for details. 
                                                   
 66 
5.2.2 Test for abnormal performance returns around reporting 
dates 
The first test is set up in the form of an ordinary least squares (OLS) indicator-variable (or 
“dummy” variable) regression. The abnormal returns 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of one of the three replicating 
portfolios i is a dependent variable, and the entire regression expression looks like this:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑑1𝑀𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝑑2𝑀𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑3𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝑑4𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡+ 𝑑6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
where dk are coefficients for six dummy variables for weeks that are beginning of the month, 
quarter, year and end of the month, quarter, end. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 when a 
week t has a corresponding property, and is equal to 0 otherwise. The b0 is an intercept and 
𝜖𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term.  
The selection of weeks around months beginning and end for testing is due to monthly 
reporting filed by the Fund’s management to Norway’s Department of Finance, in addition 
to quarter-end reports (13F-HR) and year-end detailed reports that are available to public.  
All of the explanatory variables for the regression are indicator-variables. This signifies that 
the regression is, in its essence, identical to analysis of variance11 (or ANOVA), which has a 
purpose of comparing the differences between the average of a dependent variable (left-hand 
side of the regression equation) and the average of the same variable given a property 
indicated by a dummy variable is present.  
The general validity of such regression is indicated by the F-test. The null hypothesis for the 
F-test of such kind is that all coefficients of the regression, or average means, are not 
significantly different from zero, and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the 
means is different from zero. Given the regression’s parameters such as total, between, and 
within group variations (SS) and degrees of freedom (df), the variance due to the interaction 
between the samples, or MS(B) for “Mean Square Between groups”, is compared to the 
variance due to the differences within individual samples, or MS(W) for “Mean Square 
11 Since ANOVA (and, hence, an indicator-variable regression) is sensitive to the variables’ normality assumption and the 
underlying assumption of homoscedasticity (i.e. homogeneity of variance), portfolio variables were tested for normality fit 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Kolmogorov, 1933), (Smirnov, 1948). Please, see Appendix 4 for tests details. 
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Within groups”12. Since for F-test one variance is divided by another to, originally, see how 
well a sample’s variance fits the entire population’s variance, the same approach is used for 
MS(B) and MS(W) to check if MS(B) fits MS(W). If both of the variances fit, this proves 
that the means of all variables are the same, and therefore, coefficients in the indicator-
variable OLS regression are all equal to zero, which is exactly what null hypothesis (H0) 
states. H0 is rejected if the resulting F-statistics is greater than the critical value calculated 
using F-statistics table, between and within df-s and the desired level of significance. 
The H0 tested can be formalized in the following way: “the Fund’s abnormal weekly returns 
for the weeks at the beginning and the end of months, quarters and years are on average 
significantly different from the abnormal returns for other weeks”. A positive coefficient for 
period ends would signify window dressing of the performance results before the reports are 
filed. A negative coefficient would be subsequently expected for the beginning of the next 
period weekly abnormal returns. The results of the regressions for each portfolio are 
presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. Regression results for weekly abnormal returns for replicated 
portfolios for weeks around reporting dates (coefficients in percent) 
 
Size Style Sector 
MonBeg 0.00472 0.000783 0.00130 
 
(0.724) (0.836) (0.930) 
MonEnd 0.0136 -0.000745 0.00165 
 
(0.311) (0.844) (0.911) 
QtrBeg -0.0238 0.000332 -0.0409 
 
(0.292) (0.959) (0.101) 
QtrEnd -0.0296 -0.000346 -0.00490 
 
(0.191) (0.957) (0.844) 
YearBeg -0.0309 -0.0136 0.00790 
 
(0.423) (0.212) (0.853) 
YearEnd 0.0323 0.00448 -0.0329 
 
(0.403) (0.682) (0.439) 
Constant 0.00428 -2.20e-05 0.000621 
 
(0.497) (0.990) (0.929) 
    Observations 626 626 626 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.008 
F-test 0.938 0.342 0.800 
12 Please, see Appendix 5 for calculation formulas. 
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Prob > F 0.467 0.915 0.570 
p-value in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The results of the regressions don’t support the null hypothesis. The primary reason for 
rejecting the null hypothesis is based on the p-values for F-test for each regression. Based on 
the F-test p-values, it is concluded that all coefficients are statistically not different from 
zero, and, therefore, the means for the weekly abnormal returns for the weeks around the 
reporting periods are the same.  
Significance levels, based on the F-test p-values, at which the model could be accepted as 
jointly significant for each explanatory variable are 0.467 for Size portfolio, 0.915 for Style 
portfolio, and 0.570 for Sector portfolio. Since the generally accepted significance levels are 
far below the listed values (0.1, 0.05, or 0.01, as indicated in the bottom of the table), it can 
be concluded that, given the model, there is no empirical evidence for the Fund’s 
management window dressing the Fund’s performance results around known reporting dates. 
5.2.3 Test for other patterns of abnormal performance returns  
The evidence for the Fund’s management window dressing the performance results around 
disclosure periods has not been found. However, there could be other dates that are not 
available to public for which the management has to disclose the results based, say, on 
internal valuation of performance of management teams inside the Bank.  
Hence, another test in the form of OLS indicator-variable regression is performed for 
significant differences in weekly abnormal returns for all weeks. All weekly excess returns 
are compared to the excess returns for the first week of a quarter. The model for the test has 
the following form: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + �𝑑𝑘𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘(𝑘 + 1)𝑡13
𝑘=1
+ 𝜖𝑡 
where Ri,t is excess return for one of the three portfolios i, dk are coefficients for week 
dummy variables denoted as Week with appropriate number for a week of a quarter, b0 is the 
model’s intercept and 𝜖𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term.  
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As mentioned, the base for the regression is abnormal return for the first week of a quarter, 
therefore, coefficient b1 corresponds to dummy variable Week2, and so on13. For the period 
of 12 years (48 quarters), 44 quarters were comprised of 13 weeks and 4 quarters consisted 
of 14 weeks. 
The null hypothesis for the tests is “the Fund’s abnormal weekly returns for the weeks other 
than the first week of each quarter, on average, are significantly different from the excess 
returns for the first week of a quarter”. The results of the regressions are provided in Table 
10. 
Table 10. Regression results for weekly abnormal returns for replicated 
portfolios for different weeks of a quarter (coefficients in percent) 
  Size Style Sector 
Week2 0.0716*** 0.0114* 0.0428 
 
(0.00229) (0.0869) (0.100) 
Week3 0.0141 0.00422 0.0345 
 
(0.547) (0.527) (0.185) 
Week4 0.0374 0.00362 0.0380 
 
(0.110) (0.588) (0.144) 
Week5 0.0438* 0.00482 0.0551** 
 
(0.0616) (0.470) (0.0343) 
Week6 -0.00543 -0.00381 0.00679 
 
(0.816) (0.568) (0.794) 
Week7 0.0262 0.00374 0.0467* 
 
(0.262) (0.575) (0.0732) 
Week8 0.00103 0.00628 0.0255 
 
(0.965) (0.347) (0.327) 
Week9 0.0310 -0.00364 0.0218 
 
(0.185) (0.585) (0.402) 
Week10 0.0613*** 0.00108 0.0250 
 
(0.00891) (0.872) (0.337) 
Week11 0.00901 -0.00348 0.0641** 
 
(0.700) (0.603) (0.0140) 
Week12 0.0495** 0.00268 0.0557** 
 
(0.0346) (0.688) (0.0325) 
Week13 0.0151 0.00290 0.0294 
 
(0.522) (0.667) (0.264) 
Week14 -0.0235 -0.0239 0.0343 
 
(0.694) (0.160) (0.605) 
Constant -0.0226 -0.00232 -0.0370** 
13 Having dummy variables in the model for each week would lead to a multicollinearity problem. 
                                                   
 70 
 
(0.172) (0.624) (0.0448) 
    Observations 626 626 626 
R-squared 0.042 0.020 0.020 
F-test 2.076 0.980 0.978 
Prob > F 0.0139 0.469 0.472 
p-value in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The results of the regressions are somewhat different for three portfolios. Regressions for 
Style and Sector portfolios can be dismissed for the reason of all weeks’ returns expectations 
being equal to that of the first week of a quarter. The F-test p-values values are 0.980 and 
0.978, with significance levels of acceptance of 0.469 and 0.472, which are not realistic. 
However, for the Size portfolio, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis over the 
equality of all weeks’ returns means, based on the F-test p-value value.  
The results for Size portfolio regression, therefore, should be discussed further. The intercept 
(constant) of the regression is statistically insignificant. Yet, the constant should not be 
dismissed, but rather interpreted as the expectation for abnormal returns of Size portfolio on 
the first week of a quarter being statistically not different from zero. The regression’s 
coefficients are significant only for weeks 2 (β1= 0.0716), 5 (β4= 0.0438), 10 (β9= 0.0613), 
and 12(β11= 0.0495) at significance level of 10%, 2, 10, and 12 at 5%, and 2 and 10 at 1%. 
Given a rather low coefficient of determination or R-squared (R2) that explains how well the 
data observations fit the model of only 4.2%, it is decided to proceed with the level of 
significance equal to 1% and attend to coefficients of only week 2 and week 10. 
According to the results of the regression, on average, the abnormal returns for Size portfolio 
on weeks 2 and 10 of a quarter are expected to exceed those of the first and the other weeks 
(equal to zero) by 0.0716% and 0.0613%, respectively. But does this mean that the Fund’s 
management is responsible for this expectation?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the effect of the constituents that were 
used to construct Size portfolio, namely the indexes for global Large-cap, Mid-cap, and 
Small-cap firms. In order to do this, the following OLS regression where the returns of the 
indexes in excess of the benchmark are used as explanatory variables is set up:  
𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝑅𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑅𝑆,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  
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where 𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 is Size portfolio abnormal returns,  𝑅𝐿,𝑡 is Large-cap index abnormal returns, 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is Mid-cap index abnormal returns, 𝑅𝑆,𝑡is Small-cap index abnormal return variables, bk 
are regression coefficients where b0 is a constant, and 𝜖𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term. The output for 
the regression is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Regression results for Size portfolio and Large-cap, Mid-cap, 
Small-cap indexes abnormal weekly returns (coefficients in percent) 
 
Size 
𝑅𝑆,𝑡 0.173*** 
 
(0) 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 0.0105 
 
(0.288) 
𝑅𝐿,𝑡 0.778*** 
 
(0) 
Constant -0.00288 
 
(0.250) 
  Observations 626 
R-squared 0.713 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The regression has resulted in rather noticeable R2 that states that 71.3% of the variance of 
the abnormal returns of Size portfolio is explained by the model’s independent variables. 
However, the coefficient for the Mid-cap excess returns is not statistically significant at any 
level. In order to arrive at the parsimonious model, the regression is rerun without the Mid-
cap variable and the results are provided in Table 12:  
𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝑅𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑆,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
Table 12. Regression results for Size portfolio and Large-cap, Small-cap 
indexes abnormal weekly returns (coefficients in percent) 
 
Size 
𝑅𝑆,𝑡 0.177*** 
 
(0) 
𝑅𝐿,𝑡 0.761*** 
 
(0) 
Constant -0.00291 
 
(0.246) 
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Observations 626 
R-squared 0.713 
p-value in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The updated regression for the abnormal returns of Size portfolio has the same 71.3% of R2. 
Both explanatory variables have coefficients significant at 1% level. The coefficient for 𝑅𝑆,𝑡 
is equal to 17.7% and the coefficient for 𝑅𝐿,𝑡 is 76.1%. The constant is not significant, which 
means that it is not different from zero.  
However, out of two explanatory variables, which one has most of the explanatory power for 
the excess returns of Size portfolio? In order to approach this question, partial r2 for each 
variable should be estimated. Partial r2 measures the degree of mutual relationship between 
the dependent (𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡) and one of the explanatory variables (𝑅𝐿,𝑡 or 𝑅𝑆,𝑡), when other 
explanatory variables are held constant with respect to the two variables involved in the 
explanation. In a multiple regression, partial r2 allows to directly estimate the proportion of 
unexplained variation for the dependent variable that becomes explained with the addition of 
each of the explanatory variables to the model.  
To find the partial r2 for 𝑅𝐿,𝑡, first, the effect of the other variable 𝑅𝑆,𝑡 should be removed 
from the dependent variable 𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡. For this, 𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 is regressed on 𝑅𝑆,𝑡 and the residuals are 
stored as a separate variable. Next, in order to eliminate the part of the variance of 𝑅𝐿,𝑡 that is 
explained by its covariance with 𝑅𝑆,𝑡, the first is regressed on the latter, and, again, the 
resulting residuals are stored as another variable. This last step would not be needed if both 
of the explanatory variables were orthogonal, which is, hardly, the case given the data are for 
firms traded in the same markets. Finally, the first residual variable is regressed on the 
second residual variable and the resulting r2 is compared to the partial r2 for the other 
explanatory variable, 𝑅𝑆,𝑡, which is estimated in the identical way by stripping off the effect 
of 𝑅𝐿,𝑡for other variables and regressing the resulting residuals.  
Table 13. Comparison of explanatory power of Large-cap and Small-cap 
indexes abnormal weekly returns for Size portfolio abnormal weekly 
returns, using partial r2 approach (coefficients in percent) 
 
Large-cap Small-cap 
Residuals coefficient 0.761*** 0.177*** 
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(0) (0) 
Constant 0 0 
 
(1.000) (1.000) 
   Observations 626 626 
r-squared 0.529 0.713 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
Table 13 summarizes the results. Given the obtained partial r2 equal to 52.9% and 71.3% for 
Large-cap and Small-cap abnormal weekly returns, respectively, it is possible to conclude 
that the Size portfolio’s abnormal returns variance is explained mostly by Small-cap weekly 
abnormal returns.  
Eventually, to see if Size portfolio abnormal weekly returns’ significant differences in weeks 
2 and 10 can be explained by the excess returns of Small-cap companies around the globe, 
an OLS indicator-variables regression for differences in weekly returns, similar to that of the 
regression for Size portfolio executed earlier, is set up: 
𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡 = 𝑏0 +  �𝑑𝑘𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘(𝑘 + 1)𝑡13
𝑘=1
+ 𝜖𝑡 
where RSmall,t is excess return for the Small-cap index, dk are coefficients for quarter’s week 
dummy variables Week, b0 is the model’s intercept and 𝜖𝑡 is an error term. The regression 
output is presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Regression results for weekly abnormal returns for Small-cap 
index for different weeks of a quarter (coefficients in percent) 
 
Small-cap 
Week2 0.429*** 
 
(0.00505) 
Week3 0.158 
 
(0.300) 
Week4 0.409*** 
 
(0.00745) 
Week5 0.363** 
 
(0.0173) 
Week6 0.0778 
 
(0.609) 
Week7 0.128 
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(0.400) 
Week8 0.274* 
 
(0.0728) 
Week9 0.537*** 
 
(0.000447) 
Week10 0.427*** 
 
(0.00525) 
Week11 0.101 
 
(0.508) 
Week12 0.213 
 
(0.163) 
Week13 0.293* 
 
(0.0576) 
Week14 0.115 
 
(0.767) 
Constant -0.164 
 
(0.128) 
  Observations 626 
R-squared 0.044 
F-test 2.157 
Prob > F 0.010 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
According to the F-test p-value of 2.157, the model’s coefficients are different from that of 
the constant’s value at significance level equal to 1%. This makes it possible to continue the 
discussion of the model due to its structural consistency. The expected abnormal returns for 
weeks 2 and 10 for Small-cap index are significantly higher than that of the base-case for the 
first week. Given high explanatory power of this index for the Size portfolio’s time series, it 
is concluded that it is the variance of the small-cap stocks that explains Size portfolio’s 
abnormal returns for weeks 2 and 10.  
5.2.4 Results for testing for opportunistic conduct 
Due to overall validity of the last regression model, significant positive coefficients for the 
abnormal returns of the index on weeks 2 and 10 of a quarter, and high explanatory power of 
the index for Size portfolio’s excess returns, it is plausible to infer that the Fund’s 
management does not have discretion over the difference in the observed abnormal weekly 
returns if the Fund’s portfolio is replicated continuously using the firms size method.  
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Furthermore, incorporating the results of the regressions for Style and Sector portfolios, 
which also did not support the null hypothesis that the Fund’s abnormal weekly returns for 
the weeks other than the first week of each quarter are significantly different from the excess 
returns for the first week of a quarter, it is reasonable to conclude that no empirical evidence, 
given the used model, for the Fund’s management manipulation of the Fund’s weekly excess 
returns was found, whatsoever. 
5.3 Examination of strategy execution diligence 
Putting aside any self-beneficial motives of the Fund’s management, the next set of 
empirical tests is primarily concerned with how well the Fund management’s actions 
correspond with the investment Mandate for the Fund. The management actions are tested on 
the decisions to buy and sell stocks that can be extracted from the Fund’s quarterly 13F-HR 
reports. The results of the analyses are summarized and compared with the targets set 
forward by the Fund’s investment strategy articulated by the Mandate. 
The following set of empirical tests is an attempt to examine the Fund’s trading decisions 
that can be observed using the publicly available information. The test questions are 
formulated around the Fund’s decisions to buy and sell equity securities. The decision to buy 
is analyzed as a function of the stocks’ performance relative to a number of systematic 
factors that were earlier discussed in finance theory section, a set of attributes of the stocks 
that were also covered previously, a previously made similar decision for the same stock and 
the overall tendencies over the years. The decision to sell is analyzed only for the overall 
tendencies for each year for a number of reasons that are discussed later in the section. 
In order to test how a stock’s past performance, its attributes, and the Fund’s earlier trading 
decisions regarding this stock are related to the decision to include or exclude the stock from 
the next quarter’s portfolio, the method of binomial logistic regression for panel data is 
applied.  
5.3.1 Methodology 
The intuition behind the logistic regression is, primarily, based on logistic function, which, 
unlike linear function that takes values from minus to plus infinity, has a property of taking 
values from 0 to 1. Hence the dependent variables are decisions of binary nature, namely, 
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“buy – not buy” and “sell – not sell” that can be represented as 1 and 0, accordingly. The 
probability of a decision, i.e. event happening, therefore, lies in the range [0, 1], and can be 
represented by the logistic function constructed by regressing a binary event dependent 
variable on a set of explanatory variables which transform the linear function of the 
regression in a function whose values are within the necessary range of [0, 1] rather than (-∞, 
+ ∞).  
A coefficient of the resulting logistic regression (or “logit”) is interpreted as the log odds or 
natural logarithm for odds (𝐿) that an explanatory variable will make the event (dependent 
variable) happen, given the explanatory variable is increased by one unit. If the explanatory 
variable is an indicator variable that takes 1 when a variable has a defined property and 0 
otherwise, the coefficient is interpreted as the log odd for an event to happen given the 
dummy variable’s property. For one variable, the expression formally looks like: 
𝐿(𝑦) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 = ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑) = ln � Pr (𝑥)1 − Pr (𝑥)� 
By taking the exponential of the regression’s coefficients, one obtains the odds of the event 
to happen:  Pr (𝑥)1 − Pr (𝑥) = 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1 
The odds can further be interpreted as the probability of the event (𝑃𝑟) given the explanatory 
variable increase by one unit (or its property if it’s a dummy variable) divided by the 
probability that the event does not happen given the increase (or the property). Same applies 
to a logit regression with multiple variables.  
An alternative to logit regression is probit regression which addresses the transformation of 
linear function into a function with the range of [0, 1] in a different manner. The approach is 
based on transformation of the linear function into cumulative distribution function (under 
assumption of normality). The probit function gives the “inverse” computation, generating a 
value of a normally distributed random variable (or “z-score”), associated with specified 
cumulative probability that the event, i.e. dependent binary outcome variable in the probit 
regression, will happen given a one unit increase in an explanatory variable or the property 
defined by a dummy variable. The probit regression coefficients explain the change in the z-
score for the event (dependent variable) to happen for a one unit change in the predictor.  
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Both logit and probit regressions produce rather similar to each other results and, therefore, 
can hardly be used as an alternative to each other for verification of a model. Although the 
decision of choosing one is, usually, more of a question of personal taste, the logit method is 
preferred here due to its appeal of more intuitive interpretation for the regressions output. 
The logit regression is structured as panel data in order to incorporate the effects of variance 
across stocks and across time. The variables used for the logit regressions are set up and 
adjusted in the following way.  
The decision variables “Buy” and “Sell” indicate the decision of the Fund to either buy or 
sell a stock from the portfolio. The decision variables are based on the inter-quarter 
differences in the Fund’s stock holdings, reported by the Fund as the number of shares for an 
issuer in 13F-HR form reports. If the difference between the reporting date and the previous 
date is larger than 0, the Buy variable is assigned 1 and 0 otherwise. By the same logic, if the 
difference for the number of shares is negative, the Sell variable is assigned 1 and 0 
otherwise14.  
Abnormal returns for the stocks listed by the Fund in its quarter reports act as explanatory 
variables and are composed in the following manner. Firstly, the expected returns for the 
stocks are derived using the Fama-French three factors and Carhart’s momentum factor 
model, which was extensively discussed in previous sections. The validity of this approach 
as being a reasonable one has been proven by numerous empirical studies (Hibber & 
Lawrence, 2010), (Ang, Liu, & Schwarz, 2008). The formula used is: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1�𝐸[𝑟𝑚]− 𝑟𝑓�+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖 
where 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) is the expected return for a stock, βk are coefficients for the stock return’s 
explanatory variables derived with an OLS multiple regression (β0 is constant), and rf is the 
riskless rate of return. The time series for the factors that explain the returns for the stocks 
were set up as follows. The first factor �𝐸[𝑟𝑚]− 𝑟𝑓� is the market risk premium adjusted for 
14 The first appearance of a stock on the reports is interpreted as a “buy”. The last appearance on the reports is, on the other 
hand, seldom taken for a “sell”, as the reasons for writing off a stock could be different from selling, like a restructure or 
even bankruptcy. No adjustments have been made for the stock splits or stock dividends for buy/sell variables, for the lack 
of a reliable instrument that would be generally consistent. This, however, might result in slight upward biasness of the 
model predictions, which, given a large number of stocks used for the regressions, the panel data setup, and overall 
probability for dilutive actions for the periods of the Fund’s holdings, should not significantly distort the regression results. 
The stock prices are adjusted for dilutive corporate actions. 
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the risk-free rate. For the market return, the market benchmark previously used for the 
portfolios (MSCI ACWI index) tests was utilized. For the riskless rate, the time series for the 
US Treasury 10-year bonds yields were converted into weekly rates. To set up the SMB 
factor, MSCI ACWI Large-cap index returns were subtracted from MSCI ACWI Small-cap 
returns. For HML, MSCI AC World Growth returns were subtracted from MSCI AC World 
Value15 returns. Finally, the MSCI ACWI Momentum index returns were used for Mom 
factor. The factors betas result from the regressions run for the period of 52 preceding 
weeks. Eventually, the resulting estimates for stocks’ expected weekly returns were 
subtracted from the corresponding realized returns in order to obtain the abnormal returns for 
the stocks. 
Other explanatory variables used for the logit regressions are dummy variables that control 
each stock’s attributes that were discussed previously. Each dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 for a defined property and the value of 0 otherwise.  
Each dummy variable of the first set of dummy variables is constructed to imitate the 
popularized by Morningstar so-called “equity style box”. The dummy variables for the 
stocks’ size and style properties are set up in accordance to each cell of the Figure 10: Large-
, Mid-, Small-Growth, Large-, Mid-, Small-Value, and Mid-, Small-Core. The darkened 
segment (“Large-Core”) does not have a dummy variable, as it is the base case against which 
the rest of the size-style attributes are compared.  
Figure 10. Equity style box graphic image 
 
15 The original high-minus-low book-to-market ratio was extrapolated as low-minus-high P/B ratio, which is the reciprocal 
for book-to-market. 
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Of all 3,214 stocks, there are 2.15% that are Large-Growth (69 firms), 0.25% Mid-Growth (8 
firms), 12.29% Small-Growth (395 firms), 0.81% that are Mid-Core (26 firms), 69.72% 
Small-Core (2,240 firms), 0.44% Large-Value (14 firms), 2.52% Small-Value (81 firm) and 
only 1 firm that is Mid-Value (0.03%). The rest of stocks are Large-Growth. An important 
note should be made is that, here, each stock is equally weighted, and a large number of 
Small-Core stocks do not constitute the largest share in the Fund’s portfolio, as when each 
stock is weighted with its value in the portfolio. 
Next, sector dummies are created to analyze what sectors the Fund’s management favors 
over the other. The sector dummies correspond to the ten sectors that were described earlier, 
with the relative number of stocks attributed to a corresponding sector summarized earlier in 
Table 5 (Summary for the Fund’s holdings categorized by sector).  
A dummy variable is created for Emerging markets. Classification of Emerging economies is 
according to OECD’s definition (OECD, 2014). Among the Emerging economies16 that are 
part of the dummy are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, Hungary, India, Mexico, 
Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey. 
There are 3.52% of companies (113 firms) that are identified as Emerging economies.  
Additional dummy variables for years and interaction dummies for the stocks past 
performance will be formulated and explained along the analysis rather than here for the 
consistency of the overall logic behind testing. 
5.3.2 Test for relation between “buy” decision and stocks’ earlier 
abnormal returns  
To begin with testing for the Fund’s buy decisions, the variable Buy is logit-regressed17 on 
the following set of abnormal returns: 
𝐿�𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−13 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 + 𝑏3𝑅𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 
16 The countries that are not Developed economies, but that are widely recognized as tax havens are not considered as 
Emerging markets here. 
17 Logit regressions are run under random effects condition. 
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where 𝑅𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−13 is a stock’s average weekly abnormal return for the previous quarter on the 
last week of the quarter preceding the reporting quarter. In other words, it is what the stock’s 
abnormal return was on average before the reporting quarter when the decision to buy was 
made. 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−4 is the stock’s average weekly abnormal return for the month preceding the 
reporting date and 𝑅𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1is the abnormal return for the week preceding the reporting 
week. The setup of the variables ensures that none of them overlap with each other. All 
averages are equally weighted over the period. The setup of the abnormal returns variables is 
graphically presented in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Schematic structure of abnormal returns explanatory variables 
for logit regression 
Essentially, the logit regressions are an attempt to estimate the odds of stocks that, on 
average, outperformed the market’s expectation by 1% during preceding quarter, month and 
week to appear on the Fund’s quarter reports. The results of the logit regression for Buy are 
presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Logit regression results for “buy” decision, abnormal returns 
explanatory variables 
 
Coefficient Odds ratio 
𝑅𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−13 -0.00541 0.995 
 
(0.373) 
 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 0.00730** 1.007 
 
(0.0256) 
 𝑅𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00368** 0.996 
 
(0.0253) 
 Constant 0.298*** 1.347 
 
(0) (0) 
   Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.0131 
 Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000 
 Observations 53,938 
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Number of id18 2,864   
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The model has a rather stable fit since the probability for the Wald test defined chi square 
(χ2) value for the model being lower than the critical value is almost zero (0.0131). The 
probability for statistical insignificance of the panel level component (Likelihood-ratio test 
of rho) is equal to zero19. Given the model has a stable structure both across time and across 
panel variables, the resulting coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at 
5% significance level for all explanatory variables but 𝑅𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−13. From the odd ratios, it is 
possible to conclude that the abnormal return for the month preceding the reporting month 
has a slight effect on the inclusion of a stock in the Fund’s portfolio by the end of the quarter 
with the odds of being included increasing by 1.007 with each additional percent of 
abnormal return. This odds ratio can also be interpreted as an increase in probability for 
buying a stock by 0.7% for each 1% of positive excess return for the preceding month20. The 
last week’s abnormal return, on the other side, does not have a similar effect. Quite the 
opposite, with each additional percent in weekly abnormal returns the odds of inclusion in 
the portfolio decline due to the resulting odds ratio being equal to 0.996, which means that 
the opposite option takes a larger value in the denominator with odds for being not included 
equal to 1/0.996 = 1.0037. Finally, the overall odds for buy decision for stock rather than not 
buy, on average for the entire period, amount to 1.347, according to the intercept. 
5.3.3 Test for relation between “buy” decision and combinations 
of periods for stock’s abnormal performance 
For the next model, the chances for the Fund’s management to buy an equity security are 
tested based on past performance of a stock for a combination of periods. The explanatory 
variables for Buy this time are dummy variables for stocks that demonstrated positive return 
18 The number of id categories for stocks is less than original 3,214 since some of the stocks time series did not have 
enough observations for deriving expected return for all periods or it was not possible to appropriately define buy/sell 
decision for some of the stocks.  
19 Rho (ρ) parameter explains the proportion of total variance contributed by panel variance component. Simply speaking, if 
rho is equal to 0 the panel variance component is not important and the panel regression is not superior to pooled regression 
format. The Likelihood-ratio test of rho gives the probability for rho being not significant, if it is equal to 0, then, rho is 
higher than the critical value and the panel data setup is superior to the pooled regression. 
20 This is equivalent to marginal effect (“dy/dx” for derivative notation) for the explanatory variable. 
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in excess to the expected return for preceding quarter, month and week, previous quarter and 
month, and previous month and week. The expression for the logit regression for Buy looks 
the following way: 
𝐿�𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + 𝑑1𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4 + 𝑑3𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1 
where variables 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1, 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4, and 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1are dummy 
variables for the stocks that, on average, performed well for the previous quarter at time t-13, 
month at time t-4, and week at time t-1. Each dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the 
defined performance property is fulfilled and 0 otherwise. Coefficients for the dummy 
variables are expressed as dk and b0 is the model’s intercept. 
The results of logit regressing of Buy on the set of dummy variables for the previous winners 
is presented in Table 16. 
Table 16. Logit regression results for “buy” decision, previous 
outperformers dummy explanatory variables 
 Coefficient Odds ratio 
𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1 -0.101** 0.904 
 (0.0346) 
 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑄𝑡−13𝑀𝑡−4 0.0691** 1.073 
 (0.0152) 
 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑀𝑡−4𝑊𝑡−1 0.0719** 1.076 
 (0.0129) 
 Constant 0.277*** 1.319 
 (0) 
   
Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.0117 
 Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000  
Observations 53,938  
Number of id 2,864  
p-value in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels)  
 
The logit regression has acceptable fit and panel data stability. The intercept is statistically 
different from zero, and demonstrates the Fund’s management readiness to buy rather than 
not buy a stock has the odds ratio of 1.319. The coefficients for the explanatory variables are 
significant at 5% level. The stocks that performed well during the earlier quarter and month, 
and previous month and week have, on average, 7.3% and 7.6% more chance for being 
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purchased by the management by the end of a reporting quarter. The stocks that performed 
well during all three periods, on the contrary, have an odds ratio of 0.904, which signifies 
that the odds for not buying these stocks are 1.106. 
5.3.4 Test for relation between “buy” decision and stocks’ 
categories characteristics 
Moving forward, the decision to buy is analyzed with logit panel data regression and 
explanatory variables based on the stock’s previous month performance and a set of 
dummies to control for the stock’s attributes that were discussed previously. The formal 
representation of the model is: 
𝐿�𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 + �𝑑𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖8
𝑛=1
+ �𝑑𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖18
𝑚=9
+ 𝑑19𝐸𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 is the previous month abnormal returns observed at the end of this month 
with a coefficient denoted b1 , b0 is an intercept, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖  is a set of eight dummy variables 
for a stock’s combined size (Large, Mid, Small) and style (Growth, Core, Value) attributes 
and 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 is a set of nine dummy variables that denote the firm’s sector attribute, 𝐸𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 
is a dummy for Emerging markets, and dn or m is a coefficient for a dummy variable. 
Additional details for the dummy variables have been provided earlier. The Large-Core, 
Financials sector and Developed markets variables are omitted since they constitute the base 
case against which stocks with other attributes are compared.  
The logit regression was performed with the full set of variables, the most statistically 
insignificant variable was omitted, and the regression was re-performed. Such re-
performance was repeated for a number of times omitting the weakest variable at a time. The 
output for resulting logit regression with explanatory variables that have statistically 
significant explanatory power for corresponding coefficients and odds ratios is presented in 
Table 17. 
Table 17. Logit regression results for “buy” decision, stocks’ previous month 
average abnormal returns and attributes dummy variables 
 
Coefficient Odds ratio 
𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 0.00747** 1.007 
 
(0.0216) 
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Large-Growthi 0.177** 1.193 
 
(0.0469) 
 Small-Growthi -0.415*** 0.660 
 
(0) 
 Small-Corei -0.510*** 0.600 
 
(0) 
 Large-Valuei 0.344** 1.411 
 
(0.0273) 
 Small-Valuei -0.620*** 0.538 
 
(0) 
 𝐸𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 -0.659*** 0.518 
 
(0) 
 Communicationsi  -0.187*** 0.829 
 
(0.000793) 
 Consumer Discretionaryi -0.196*** 0.822 
 
(0) 
 Health Carei -0.187*** 0.830 
 
(0) 
 Constant 0.781*** 2.185 
 
(0) 
  
Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.000 
 Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000  
Observations 53,938  
Number of id 2,864 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
Since the probabilities for the model’s poor fit and the panel data instability criteria for the 
structural fit equal zero, further inferences regarding the Fund’s management decision to buy 
stocks can be made. Under the base case scenario, Large-Core stocks that operate in 
Financials sector and originate from a Developed economy have odds of being bought rather 
than not bought equal to 2.185. On the other hand, the value for likelihood of a stock being 
purchased based on the previous month’s outperformance has a value of 1.007, which is 
almost identical to the first model where this variable is used. The Fund is even more willing 
to purchase Large-cap stocks if they can be attributed to Growth and Value stocks, with the 
probability of buying such stocks equal to 19.3% and 41.1%, respectively, over just the 
majority of Large stocks attributed as Core. Other size - style combinations and sectors have 
inferior odds for being purchased compared to that of the base group. The odds for stocks to 
be purchased if they fall out of the Large-Core category are 0.660 for Small-Growth, 0.6 for 
Small-Core, and 0.538 for Small-Value. For sectors that are non-financial the odds are 0.829 
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for Communications, 0.822 for Consumer Discretionary and 0.830 for Health Care. The 
probability for a financial Large-Core stock to be purchased if it originates from an 
Emerging economy is 48.2% less (odds ratio is 0.518) than if it comes from a Developed 
economy. 
But the Fund is not buying a stock on the market only once. After a stock has been 
purchased for the first time, management adjusts the Fund’s position over time. This means 
that a decision to buy a stock can be also motivated by an earlier purchase.  
5.3.5 Test for relation between “buy” decision, earlier decision to 
buy and stocks’ categories characteristics 
To analyze the effect of an earlier purchase of a stock, the last regression is re-performed, 
but with a new variable. The new variable is a lagged dummy variable for Buy. The rest of 
the model is identical to the previous. Formally, the logit regression model can be expressed 
like:    
𝐿�𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝑑1𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝑑3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖+ 𝑑4𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖  + 𝑑5𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑6𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑7𝐸𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖+ 𝑑8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝑑9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 
where 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is the new variable that denotes lagged dependent 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 variable.  
The results of the logit regression are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18. Logit regression results for “buy” decision, previous decision to 
buy, stocks’ previous month average abnormal returns and attributes 
dummy variables 
 
Coefficients Odds ratio 
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 0.367*** 1.444 
 
(0) 
 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 0.00615* 1.006 
 
(0.0580) 
 Large-Growthi 0.151* 1.163 
 
(0.0586) 
 Small-Growthi -0.390*** 0.677 
 
(0) 
 Small-Corei -0.478*** 0.620 
 
(0) 
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Large-Valuei 0.310** 1.363 
 
(0.0267) 
 Small-Valuei -0.578*** 0.561 
 
(0) 
 𝐸𝑚𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 -0.612*** 0.542 
 
(0) 
 Communicationsi  -0.175*** 0.839 
 
(0.00067) 
 Consumer Discretionaryi -0.177*** 0.838 
 
(0) 
 Health Carei -0.170*** 0.843 
 
(0) 
 Constant 0.543*** 1.721 
 
(0) 
 
   Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.000 
 Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000  
Observations 53,938  
Number of id 2,864  
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The model has a proper fit and is acceptably stable across the panel categories. The 
coefficient for the base case stock, which is Large-Core financial firms from a Developed 
economy, as the result of inclusion of the new variable has considerably diminished from the 
odds ratio of 2.185 to 1.721. The same is true for other Large size stocks whose ratios 
became 1.163 and 1.363, respectively. Given previously a decision to buy has been made, 
the odds for a base case stock to be purchased again are 1.444, which, according to the 
model, explains 0.001 of the monthly abnormal returns odds ratio for being purchased, 
making it 1.006. The odds for the stocks with other size-style attributes have, on the other 
hand, slightly improved with the odds of 0.677 for Small-Growth, 0.620 for Small-Core, and 
0.561 for Small-Value stocks. The same is for sectors that now have the estimates for odds 
of being purchased against that of for Financials are equal to 0.839 for Communications, 
0.838 for Consumer Discretionary, and 0.843 for Health Care. Eventually, the odds ratio for 
the stocks originating from Emerging economies for being purchased, given other criteria are 
similar to base-case, is 0.542. 
Eventually, the sensitivity of the Fund’s management decision to buy a stock to the previous 
month’s abnormal return should not be viewed as being constant over time. The 12 year 
period was notable for rapid growth in 2003-2006, and 2008-2009 are remarkable for the 
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Financial Crisis. All this should, certainly, have an impact on the Fund’s management 
decision to buy stocks. 
5.3.6 Test for “buy” decision dynamics over the 12 year period 
In order to test these differences throughout 12 years a set of yearly dummy variables was 
created. Each dummy is assigned the value of 1 for a given year and the value of 0 
otherwise. There are 11 dummies for years 2001-2011, and the base year against which other 
years are compared is 2012. The variables are used in the logit regression together with the 
variable for previous month’s abnormal returns (𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4): 
𝐿�𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 + �𝑑𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡11
𝑘=1
 
where b1 is a coefficient for previous month’s abnormal returns, dk are coefficients for Year 
dummy variables, and b0 is the model’s intercept.  
The results of the logit regression for the model are presented in Table 19. 
Table 19. Logit regression results for “buy” decision, stocks’ previous month 
average abnormal returns and year dummy variables 
 
Coefficients Odds ratio 
      
𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−4 0.0115*** 1.012 
 
(0.000998) 
 2001 2.461*** 11.72 
 
(0) 
 2002 1.482*** 4.400 
 
(0) 
 2003 1.178*** 3.249 
 
(0) 
 2004 0.455*** 1.577 
 
(0) 
 2005 0.556*** 1.743 
 
(0) 
 2006 0.120** 1.127 
 
(0.0164) 
 2007 2.767*** 15.91 
 
(0) 
 2008 1.311*** 3.710 
 
(0) 
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2009 0.754*** 2.125 
 
(0) 
 2010 -0.194*** 0.823 
 
(0) 
 2011 0.398*** 1.490 
 
(0) 
 Constant -0.393*** 0.675 
 
(0) 
  
Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.000  
Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000  
Observations 53,938  
Number of id 2,864  
p-value in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The model is appropriately stable across the stock categories and has an adequate fit. All 
coefficients and the model’s constant are significantly different from zero at 1% of 
confidence, with the only exception of the coefficient for 2006, which is still significant at 
the level of 1.64%, according to its p-value. For 2012, the odds for buying rather than not 
buying a stock are equal to 0.675, according to the intercept. Given this, the probability for a 
stock to be purchased in 2012 given 1% increase in average abnormal return for the month 
preceding the reporting is equal to 1.2%, since the odds ratio for the coefficient is 1.012. All 
years, with the exception of 2010 with the odds of only 0.823, have demonstrated higher 
odds for the stocks to be bought. Remarkably, Fund’s management readiness to purchase 
stocks based on the abnormal returns for the previous month had odds for purchase equal to 
11.72 in 2001 and 15.91 in 2007. In addition the odds for the Fund to buy a stock were 3.71 
and 2.125, relatively to the base year, in years 2008 and 2009, respectively. The odds for a 
decision to buy for the remaining years are equal to 4.40 for 2002, 3.249 for 2003, 1.577 for 
2004, 1.743 for 2005, 1.127 for 2006, and 1.49 for 2011. The odds for each year are plotted 
against the 2012 base-case odds (=1) in Figure 12 for visual comparison. 
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Figure 12. Odds for decision to “buy” based on the previous to quarter’s 
end month’s abnormal returns across years relative to that of 2012 (=1) 
 
Finally, the Fund’s decision to sell stocks is discussed. An important remark that should be 
made here is that broad testing of the Fund’s management decision to sell stocks, as in case 
of the buy decision that has been tested across stocks dynamic performance, their qualitative 
attributes, relation to a previously made analogous decision for the same stock, and for 
different time periods, is hardly possible.  
Firstly, it is the Fund’s long-term investment horizon that implies the Fund’s trading activity 
balance is heavily tilted to actively buying stocks for long-term holding rather than 
benefitting from dynamic timely sales after a short time period, which is more appropriate 
for a speculative attitude. Secondly, the Fund’s strong liquidity positions with more capital 
relatively steadily coming in every month, allow the Fund to keep up to short-term losers 
much longer than other market agents. In a sense, it would be rather challenging to articulate 
the intuition behind stock sales for a particular dynamic performance pattern or type of 
stocks, given the need for a sale due to pressing liquidity constraints could in most cases be 
discarded due to the Fund’s remarkably deep pockets. Finally, the Fund’s investment 
Mandate, to a certain extent, dictates the rules for sales, in particular, under monthly 
rebalancing conditions.  
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5.3.7 Test for “sell” decision dynamics over the 12 year period 
Given all of the limitations for the analysis of the Fund’s decisions to sell stocks under 
particular trading intuition that can be clearly formulated, it is still possible to perform a 
general overview for the Fund’s stock sales dynamics across time. For this, a model similar 
to that of the preceding one is formulated: 
𝐿�𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡� = 𝑏0 + �𝑑𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡11
𝑘=1
 
where dk are coefficients for Year dummy variables, and b0 is the model’s intercept. As in 
the previous model, the base year against which other years’ decisions to sell stocks are 
compared is 2012. The model’s explanatory variables are all indicator-variables that take 1 
for a given year and 0 otherwise.  
The results of the logit regression for Sell variable are presented in Table 20 and the 
dynamics are plotted in Figure 13. 
Table 20. Logit regression results for “sell” decision, year dummy variables 
 
Coefficients Odds Ratios 
2001 -1.567*** 0.209 
 
(0) 
 2002 0.454*** 1.575 
 
(3.63e-08) 
 2003 0.806*** 2.239 
 
(0) 
 2004 1.527*** 4.606 
 
(0) 
 2005 1.462*** 4.315 
 
(0) 
 2006 1.843*** 6.314 
 
(0) 
 2007 -0.387*** 0.679 
 
(0) 
 2008 0.495*** 1.640 
 
(0) 
 2009 0.675*** 1.964 
 
(0) 
 2010 0.351*** 1.421 
 
(0) 
 2011 -0.0421 0.959 
 
(0.397) 
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Constant -2.022*** 0.132 
 
(0) 
  
Prob > χ2 (Wald test) 0.000  
Prob ≥ χ�(Likelihood-ratio test of rho)        0.000  
Observations 53,938  
Number of id 2,864  
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significant at given levels) 
 
The model has reliable structure. All coefficients are statistically significant from the 
constant at the level of 1%, except for the year 2011. The odds for selling the stocks that the 
Fund owns against not selling, on average, are 0.132 or 1: 7.58, for the base year of 2012. 
For the years of 2001 and 2007, the Fund’s management was even more reluctant to sell, 
with the odds for selling a stock after it had been purchased earlier equal to only 0.209 and 
0.679, respectively. The highest odds for selling a stock are estimated for the year 2006 with 
the odds ratio of 6.314. All years odds, as mentioned, are compared against the base year, 
and other years have the following odds ratios: 1.575 for 2002, 2.239 for 2003, 4.606 for 
2004, 4.315 for 2005, 1.640 for 2008, 1.964 for 2009, and 1.421 for 2010.  
Figure 13. Odds for decision to “sell” based across years relative to that of 
2012 (=1) 
 
* * statistically not significant 
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5.3.8 Results for examination of strategy execution diligence 
The conclusions for the results produced by the models structured for the Fund’s decisions to 
buy and sell stocks can be summarized as following.  
For the stocks that have previously outperformed the market, the odds for inclusion are not 
dramatically different from the overall odds of purchasing a stock. For the stocks that on 
average outperformed the market’s expectation during the month preceding the reporting 
there is a slightly higher chance, only 0.7% probability, of being included rather than not 
included. The weekly outperformers, on the other hand, have a slightly lower chance for 
being bought, with the odds for being rather not purchased 0.4% higher. This can be 
perceived as an indication of a fairly sensible approach to buying stocks, since the prices for 
the stocks have empirically documented signs of inflations by the end of a quarter due to 
trading activities of commercial investment funds (Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, & Reed, 2002). 
The evidence that the Fund is reluctant to buy stocks that outperform during the weeks that 
precede the reporting dates is, yet, another compelling confirmation that the Fund’s 
management is not engaged in window dressing of the Fund’s performance figures before 
their disclosure. 
The combined outperformance of a stock during the preceding month and quarter, or month 
and week yields slightly higher odds for a stock to be purchased by the Fund, which could be 
an indication that the management might view the monthly outperformance of a stock as an 
indication for a long-term buy. The odds for being purchased are 7.3% higher for combined 
outperformance during the previous month and quarter, and 7.6% for month and week. The 
stocks that on average continuously outperformed during the previous quarter, month and 
week have, on the contrary, lower chances for being included in the portfolio. The odds for 
not inclusion are almost 10% higher. This can be interpreted as the management’s reluctance 
for purchasing a stock that could, by the time of the purchase, get “overheated” due to 
augmented attention from the market caused by remarkable performance. This is viewed as 
generally a good tack, as such a stock usually becomes overbought rather quickly and, 
hence, its price has a rather high chance for reverting back to its true value. Managing the 
Fund with a rather long-term horizon, engaging in short-span market herd behavior could 
hardly be appropriate for the management. 
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From all of the universe of the stocks that are traded on recognized and well regulated 
exchange platforms, the Fund’s management favors those that are large in size, operate in 
Financials sector and originate from a Developed economy. The odds ratio for purchasing a 
stock rather than not purchasing is 2.185 if a stock is issued by a large company. The 
decision to buy a stock is more likely if a large stock can be identified as a growth company, 
with the previous odds for purchase increasing by 1.193, and even more likely if a stock is 
strongly underpriced in relation to its book value, such as tock adds up another 1.411 to the 
odds of being purchased if it were market-priced. This can be regarded as another rather 
suitable position for selecting stocks for the Fund’s portfolio appropriate to an investor with 
a long investment horizon. Apart from large firm stocks being relatively safer than the small 
ones, considering the Fund’s enormous size, investing in a large number of small companies 
would be rather problematic due to not only higher monitoring costs, but also, the limitations 
of 10% maximum ownership imposed by the Fund’s investment Mandate, as this limit can 
be reached relatively easily. Communications, Consumer Discretionary, and Health Care 
sector stocks have odds for being purchased of slightly over 0.8, in comparison to the base 
case. This, however, still means that the odds for large company stocks from these sectors 
have odds for being bought rather than not bought equal to 1.75. The Emerging economy 
origin for a stock lowers its chances for being purchased by almost a half.  
After controlling for the previously made “buy” decisions, the odds for the stocks being 
purchased based on their attributes of size, style, sector, and country of origin have become 
more moderate, but the overall tendencies with preferences for large financial companies 
originating from a Developed economy remained generally unaltered. The odds ratio for a 
stock to be bought if it was purchased previously is equal to 1.44. The intuition behind 
favoring stocks that are already owned can be the Fund’s management being already familiar 
with the securities they buy. Moreover, stocks for large companies are better covered by 
analysts and financial information providers. This can also be considered as another 
indication of the Fund’s management being rather conservative in their investment 
purchases. 
Throughout the period of 12 years, the Fund’s tendency for buying stocks has not been 
homogenous. The dynamics for the Fund managers’ readiness to buy stocks, roughly, follow 
the overall markets sentiments over the years. This is not surprising given the Fund’s 
performance is benchmarked along a broad global index. The tendency for purchasing was 
gradually decreasing from 2001 to 2006. However, the pre-crisis year of 2007 was 
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remarkable for the Fund’s odds ratio for buying equal to 15.91 if compared to that of 2012. 
This propensity for purchasing stocks can be explained. Firstly, the Mandate’s prescription 
for the assets class allocation was altered from 40% to 60% of total value of the Fund that 
should be invested in equities (Regjeringen, 2006-2007). This, obviously, led to a massive 
increase in stocks buys that started in 2007. Another reason is that, together with the 
prescription to buy more equity, the Fund had to keep up with the assigned 60% of portfolio 
invested in equity and 40% in fixed income no matter what. This should trigger additional 
stocks purchases under condition of uneven overall trends for equity and fixed income 
markets growth. In other words, the equity portfolio should be rebalanced up given the bonds 
market is performing better than equities or the equity market is depreciating faster than 
bonds to maintain the Fund’s 60% of market value invested in stocks at all time. Given the 
equity market did not experience its best times during late 2007 and the Financial Crisis of 
2008 and 2009, in order to keep up with the 60% value allocation in equity, the Fund’s 
management continued to buy stocks aggressively during this period. The final four year 
period is noticeable for a rather conservative attitude towards the stocks purchases with the 
odds ratio for buying rather than not buying equal to 0.675 in 2012.  
Finally, the dynamics for selling a stock over the years have not been similar to each other as 
well. The tendencies for the Fund’s management readiness to sell were somewhat the 
opposite of the decision to buy. For the base year of 2012, the overall odds for selling a stock 
that is already owned by the Fund are 0.132 to 1, or in other words, only 1 of 7.6 stocks is 
expected to be sold. The dynamics over the years of 2002-2005 and 2008-2009 can be 
described as steadily increasing. The highest odds of 6.314 for selling, relatively to 2012, 
were in 2006. This can partially be explained by exclusion of a number of large companies 
due to new guidelines for the Fund’s Responsible Investing policy (Etikkrådet for Statens 
pensjonsfond - Utland, 2006) adopted by Norway’s Department of Finance, which resulted 
in exclusion of a number of large tobacco producers (Finansdepartementet, 2014) and some 
other large companies like Wal-Mart (Finansdepartementet, 2006) for bridging the human 
rights of their workers. The odds for selling were dramatically down in year 2007, equaling 
only 0.679. This coincides with the high odds for buying stocks from the previous analysis. 
Such a relationship is also observed for the year 2001. Although, the odds for both buying 
and selling are dramatic for this year, it is hardly possible to make solid conclusions without 
seeing the earlier dynamics.  
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Generally, the analyses of the Fund’s management decision making regarding buying and 
selling stocks can be summarized as rather conservative and along the Fund’s investment 
mandate. 
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6. Conclusion 
Summarizing the phenomenon of SWFs, it can be concluded that SWFs play important 
economic and social roles in today’s global environment. From being marginal investors 
they advanced to becoming important players on the international capital markets arena.  
Primary differences between commercial funds and SWFs come from SWFs more socially 
oriented objectives centralized around conserving and further augmenting wealth for future 
generations of a nation, sources of capital originating from a country’s revenues from 
commodities sales or international trade surplus, and a higher degree of international 
cooperation. Furthermore, SWFs have substantially outgrown their commercial counterparts 
for the recent decades. SWFs also have superior to most of the commercial funds liquidity 
positions. Organizational structure and evaluation of management performance, although 
different from SWF to SWF, in some cases, resemble commercial funds setups. SWFs have 
lower management costs and substantial political liabilities that should also be 
accommodated to by an SWF’s management.  
The Fund is an SWF that was formed by Norwegian government with the purpose of 
managing the country’s budget surpluses coming from taxation and state-owned companies’ 
participation in exploration and extraction of oil. The Fund invests in three classes of assets, 
equity and fixed income securities and real estate. Over the time, the Fund has demonstrated 
adequate performance along the benchmarks prescribed by the Fund’s investment Mandate. 
The Mandate also provides general guidance for the Fund’s management for the Fund’s 
investment strategy that can be outlined as fairly conservative due to, primarily, its long-term 
investment horizon.  
The Fund is an SWF with a relatively high degree of its management independence. In 
addition, there is theoretical and empirical evidence for deterioration of managers’ skill with 
a fund’s size growing. Besides, SWFs pose specific challenges for managers coming from 
commercial funds. All this, in combination with the managers’ compensation tied to the 
results of their performance, makes the matter of how prudent the Fund’s managers are in 
their work exceptionally important. 
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Addressing the central question of the research of how well the Fund’s managers do their job 
along two view points on imprudence, the conclusions based on the results of empirical 
analyses are recapped as following. 
Based on the results of testing for opportunistic conduct in form of window dressing of the 
results of the Fund’s management performance around known reporting dates and testing for 
evidence of similar actions around other periods, given the data and methodology used for 
empirical assessment, no evidence of such opportunistic actions was found. The expectation 
for abnormal return for each week is not significantly different from that of the expectation 
for the weeks for which the performance results are disclosed.    
After examining the Fund’s management decisions regarding buying and selling stocks 
along the guidelines prescribed by the Fund’s investment Mandate, it can be concluded that, 
given the data and methodological approach, the Fund’s management is diligent in execution 
of the Fund’s rather conservative investment strategy. The management is not prone to 
purchase stocks that can potentially be overpriced due to excessive attention from the market 
for their consecutive abnormal performance over the period of previous quarter, month, and 
week. In addition, the evidence for slightly higher odds for not purchasing a stock that 
showed positive return in excess of widely recognized systematic risk factors over the last 
week of a quarter is also in favor of the Fund’s management savvy since stock prices have a 
high chance of being inflated during this period. Moreover, the management favors stocks of 
large companies and prefers to buy stocks of firms that it is reasonably familiar with. 
Judging by the dynamics of stocks purchases and sells, for the period of 2001-2012, the 
management has been persistent in the Fund’s portfolio rebalancing and acting along the 
instructions imposed by the investment Mandate and responsible investing guidelines. 
Not being able to identify evidence that could be attributed to either the Fund’s management 
acting deviously with a motive to personally benefit from such actions or confirmation that 
the management decisions to buy and sell stocks notably deviate from the Fund’s investment 
policies set forward by the country’s government, it is reasonable to conclude that the Fund’s 
management has actually been prudent in its work. 
For further research, the results of the analyses could be substantially improved given it 
would be possible to obtain additional data. Such data could comprise more frequent changes 
in holdings over time with a more comprehensive list of securities. The analyses could also 
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be adjusted for other classes of assets like fixed income portfolio or even real estate, given 
appropriate data could be obtained. Furthermore, information on comprehensive structure for 
the internal Bank’s reporting, detailed compensation system, trading activities and portfolio 
holdings data for each division, group of portfolio managers or even individual portfolio 
managers would make it possible to thoroughly examine the managers’ work along the 
suggested by the research framework and obtain results that could be further implemented to 
analyze weaknesses of the current Bank’s compensation system and, subsequently, improve 
it.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Summary of the Fund’s holdings as presented by the data 
Quarter  Stocks (number of firms)   Total market value (USD)  
2000 Q4                                  369                                586,651  
2001 Q1                                  439                                519,754  
2001 Q2                                  444                             1,157,007  
2001 Q3                                  442                             1,189,076  
2001 Q4                                  415                             3,849,428  
2002 Q1                                  419                             4,610,421  
2002 Q2                                  440                             4,880,172  
2002 Q3                                  455                             5,424,316  
2002 Q4                                  459                             6,362,590  
2003 Q1                                  446                             8,463,425  
2003 Q2                                  456                           10,585,552  
2003 Q3                                  600                           10,752,314  
2003 Q4                                  602                           13,127,264  
2004 Q1                                  604                           14,169,057  
2004 Q2                                  633                           15,514,384  
2004 Q3                                  611                           13,630,373  
2004 Q4                                  686                           16,667,129  
2005 Q1                                  720                           17,884,496  
2005 Q2                                  697                           17,933,390  
2005 Q3                                  673                           17,982,284  
2005 Q4                                  667                           20,468,004  
2006 Q1                                  669                           20,801,752  
2006 Q2                                  656                           19,490,132  
2006 Q3                                  666                           19,885,430  
2006 Q4                                  666                           20,990,260  
2007 Q1                                  610                           24,024,328  
2007 Q2                               1,258                           28,167,972  
2007 Q3                               2,060                           34,191,872  
2007 Q4                               2,090                           38,163,836  
2008 Q1                               2,078                           41,555,652  
2008 Q2                               2,118                           48,340,088  
2008 Q3                               2,093                           45,135,656  
2008 Q4                               2,061                           37,712,688  
2009 Q1                               2,056                           35,343,640  
2009 Q2                               2,016                           50,112,120  
2009 Q3                               2,040                           65,184,376  
2009 Q4                               2,047                           69,651,624  
2010 Q1                               2,038                           73,914,976  
2010 Q2                               2,014                           66,863,448  
2010 Q3                               2,008                           77,717,040  
2010 Q4                               2,027                           93,682,072  
2011 Q1                               2,020                          106,148,136  
2011 Q2                               1,966                          108,641,712  
2011 Q3                               1,949                           91,148,216  
2011 Q4                               2,020                          104,465,320  
2012 Q1                               1,980                          119,897,248  
2012 Q2                               1,962                          118,991,376  
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2012 Q3                               1,951                          141,847,936  
2012 Q4                               1,951                          130,602,264  
 
Appendix 2. Average P/B ratios for industries (source http://www.damodaran.com) 
Industry Name Number of firms P/B 
Advertising 65 4.68 
Aerospace/Defense 95 4.17 
Air Transport 25 7.62 
Apparel 70 4.43 
Auto & Truck 26 2.48 
Auto Parts 75 2.33 
Bank 7 1.48 
Banks (Regional) 721 1.27 
Beverage  47 5.68 
Beverage (Alcoholic) 19 2.69 
Biotechnology 349 7.88 
Broadcasting 30 3.11 
Brokerage & Investment Banking 49 1.25 
Building Materials 37 3.61 
Business & Consumer Services 179 3.71 
Cable TV 16 5.81 
Chemical (Basic) 47 2.30 
Chemical (Diversified) 10 3.06 
Chemical (Specialty) 100 3.59 
Coal & Related Energy 45 1.52 
Computer Services 129 5.54 
Computer Software 273 4.16 
Computers/Peripherals 66 3.39 
Construction 18 2.74 
Diversified 20 2.46 
Educational Services 40 2.05 
Electrical Equipment 135 4.00 
Electronics 191 2.09 
Electronics (Consumer & Office) 26 1.57 
Engineering 56 1.84 
Entertainment 85 3.07 
Environmental & Waste Services 108 2.69 
Farming/Agriculture 29 1.39 
Financial Svcs. 76 2.56 
Financial Svcs. (Non-bank & Insurance) 17 0.84 
Food Processing 97 3.38 
Food Wholesalers 18 3.51 
Furn/Home Furnishings 36 2.71 
Healthcare Equipment 193 3.26 
Healthcare Facilities 47 4.77 
Healthcare Products 58 3.21 
Healthcare Services 126 2.36 
Heathcare Information and Technology 125 3.89 
Heavy Construction 46 3.28 
Homebuilding 32 1.93 
Hotel/Gaming 89 3.33 
Household Products 139 4.49 
Information Services 71 5.72 
Insurance (General) 26 0.93 
Insurance (Life) 27 1.20 
Insurance (Prop/Cas.) 53 1.31 
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Internet software and services 330 5.09 
Investment Co. 65 1.14 
Machinery 141 3.23 
Metals & Mining 134 1.63 
Office Equipment & Services 30 4.60 
Oil/Gas (Integrated) 8 2.00 
Oil/Gas (Production and Exploration) 411 1.91 
Oil/Gas Distribution 80 2.12 
Oilfield Svcs/Equip. 163 2.15 
Packaging & Container 24 3.38 
Paper/Forest Products 21 2.93 
Pharma & Drugs 138 3.78 
Power 106 1.64 
Precious Metals 166 0.96 
Publshing & Newspapers 52 1.81 
R.E.I.T. 46 0.91 
Railroad 10 3.30 
Real Estate (Development) 22 1.87 
Real Estate (General/Diversified) 11 2.64 
Real Estate (Operations & Services) 47 3.15 
Recreation 70 4.41 
Reinsurance 3 1.00 
Restaurant 84 7.56 
Retail (Automotive) 30 5.32 
Retail (Building Supply) 7 6.19 
Retail (Distributors) 87 3.62 
Retail (General) 21 3.28 
Retail (Grocery and Food) 21 4.35 
Retail (Internet) 47 11.00 
Retail (Special Lines) 137 3.38 
Rubber& Tires 4 2.70 
Semiconductor 104 2.80 
Semiconductor Equip 51 2.33 
Shipbuilding & Marine 14 1.78 
Shoe 14 5.32 
Steel 37 1.67 
Telecom (Wireless) 28 2.21 
Telecom. Equipment 131 2.66 
Telecom. Services 82 1.86 
Thrift 223 1.03 
Tobacco 12 103.20 
Transportation 22 5.99 
Trucking 28 4.20 
Utility (General) 20 1.76 
Utility (Water) 20 1.96 
Total Market 7766 2.60 
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Appendix 3. Unit-root tests for replicated portfolios abnormal returns 
For Size portfolio (1-6 lags) 
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For Style portfolio (1-6 lags) 
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For Sector portfolio (1-6 lags) 
 
 
 
 
 111 
Appendix 4. Replicated portfolios abnormal returns residuals normality tests 
 
Appendix 5. F-test calculation formulas (one-way ANOVA) 
1) H0: all population means are equal, Ha: at least one mean is different. 
2) Calculating Grand Mean (x – data values, N – total sample size): 
 
3) Calculating total variation: 
 
4) Calculating between group variation (n – sample size within groups): 
 
5) Calculating within group variation (k- number of samples, df- degree of freedom; df 
= N – k): 
 
6) Calculating variance due to the interaction between the samples (s2w) or MS(B) for 
Mean Square Between groups:  s2w = SS(B)/k-1 
7)  Calculating variance due to the differences within individual samples (s2w) or 
MS(W) for Mean Square Within groups:  s2b= SS(W)/N-k 
8) Calculating F-test statistic:  
 
